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PERSUASION FROM A TO P: BACK TO THE
BASICS
Roy T. Stuckey*
I. INTRODUCTION
Advocacy is one of the two primary activities of the
American lawyer.' The daily work of most lawyers includes
trying to persuade somebody about something. It is natural
for lawyers to want to become masters of persuasion in or-
der to provide effective services to their clients. Unfortunate-
ly, efforts to teach advocacy to lawyers seldom, if ever, in-
clude a broad view of advocacy or explain fundamental prin-
ciples of persuasion.2
The basic principles of advocacy were developed by the
Greeks over two thousand years ago,' but the classical rheto-
ric of Aristotle is not a familiar subject to the modern law-
yer. Today, rhetoric has become a word with negative conno-
tations. "Ordinary usage now defines rhetoric as the specious,
bombastic or deceitful use of language; rhetoric, in other
words, is the abuse of language ... ."4 However, the ancient
* © 1990 by Roy T. Stuckey. Clinical Professor, University of South Caroli-
na School of Law; A.B., 1970, Davidson College; J.D., 1973, University of South
Carolina.
1. The American Bar Association recognizes the primary roles of the lawyer
as advocate and counselor and it uses this division to define the professional obli-
gations of lawyers. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Proposed Official
Draft 1981), (Preamble), (Adapted 1983).
2. In Why Teach Trial Advocacy? An Essay on 'Never Ask Why', Humanistic
Education in Law: Monograph Il1 68 (Columbia University School of Law, 1981),
Kenney Hegland criticizes trial advocacy courses and skills courses in general for
several reasons, including their overemphasis on technique and their
underemphasis on the philosophical and psychological underpinnings of technique.
He recommends "the use of theory not to make students more skillful but to
encourage them to question and perhaps ultimately change the skills we teach and
the world in which those skills appear to work."
3. Cf. ARISTOTLE, THE ART OF RHETORIC U. Freese trans. 1926) (reprinted in
1975). See also J. KINNEAVY, A THEORY OF DISCOURSE (1971) and E. CORBETT,
CLASSICAL RHETORIC FOR THE MODERN STUDENT (2d ed. 1971).
4. P. GOODRICH, LEGAL DISCOURSE 85 (1987).
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Greeks associated rhetoric with the art of oratory, primarily
with persuasive discourse. Classical rhetoric was a system for
discovering and using all available means to persuade an
audience to think or to act in a certain way. Aristotle de-
fined rhetoric as "the faculty of discovering the possible
means of persuasion in reference to any subject whatever."'
Thus, rhetoric should be a topic of genuine interest to law-
yers.
Until the late nineteenth century, rhetoric was a subject
of study for all lawyers, but it disappeared from basic legal
education with the advent of academically-based legal educa-
tion and the de-emphasis of practice-oriented instruction.
6
These historical events, however, do not diminish the impor-
tance of rhetoric for the modern lawyer.
This article was inspired by the contemporary writings of
Chaim Perelman, a Belgian philosopher and lawyer, who pur-
sued the development of a "new rhetoric,"7 a discipline
founded in Aristotelian rhetoric which would "unite the top-
ics and rhetoric in one single branch of study of reasoning
with an audience in view."
8
Neither Perelman nor the adherents to his theories have
5. ARISTOTLE, supra note 3, at 15.
6. Cf Reike, Argumentation in the Legal Process, in ADVANCES IN ARGUMENTA-
TION TIEORY AND RESEARCH 363 (1982) [hereinafter ADVANCES]. (The remnants of
medievalism left rhetoric with a seedy image of sophistry, and law schools found
themselves in tough competition with the apprenticeship system. Although Yale
was a holdout, it was Harvard that set the pattern for legal education that has
prevailed until this time. "At Harvard, the theory was that legal education should
consist of study in philosophy and principles of law. The rhetorical-communicative
elements were completely rejected on the grounds that all one needed to be an
effective advocate was knowledge of the law." Id. at 366.).
7. C. PERELMAN & L. OBRECtffs-TYrECA, THE NEW RHETORIC: A TREATISE
ON ARGUMENTATION (1971) [hereinafter THE NEW, RHETORIC]. See also C.
PERELMAN, THE REALM OF RHETORIC (1982) and ADVANCES, supra note 6.
8. Cf THE NEW RHETORIC, supra note 7, at 118.
The new rhetoric thus owes its specific character to the relation
between speaker and listener, between the man who tries to per-
suade and those whom he seeks to persuade. Its object of study
should therefore be wholly general, not restricted to the techniques
designed for a particular audience (for example the nonspecialized
public), or to a particular medium of communication (oral or writ-
ten, direct or nondirect) or to any single form of persuasive commu-
nication (discourse or treatise, formal or informal discussion, inward
deliberation) or to the contents of this communication (political dis-
course, counsel's speech, philosophical treatise, academic address,
report at scientific congress, etc.).
(Vol. 30678
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succeeded in fully describing the parameters of this new
discipline. However, this article incorporates some features of
discipline and some features of the new rhetoric. It disre-
gards the distinctions between dialectic and rhetoric, it draws
upon a wide range of concepts about persuasion, it focuses
on the audience, and it emphasizes the role of value judg-
ments in human decision-making.
Aristotle and Perelman did not write about modern law
practice, and their phraseology and examples are alien to the
worlds of lawyers and law students. This article converts their
words into language which is more understandable to law-
yers, and it adapts their concepts to law practice situations.9
Persuasion is a multi-faceted subject which no short arti-
cle can fully explain.'" However, this article should serve as
a useful guide for the lawyer who is actively engaged in plan-
ning persuasion, even in the context of minor everyday prob-
lems. The basic structure and the key concepts are relatively
simple. They should be easy to remember and apply, once
the lawyer has become acquainted with them.
II. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
A. Persuasion Defined
A suitable definition of persuasion is elusive. Webster's
defines "persuade" as "to move by argument, entreaty, or
expostulation to a belief, position, or course of action." An-
other description is:
"[P]ersuasion" refers to two related but different things:
9. The title of this paper signals its relationship to the works of Aristotle
and Perelman. However, "from A to P" also signifies the incompleteness of our
understanding about persuasion and our present inability to fully describe the
parameters of Perelman's new rhetoric.
10. Cf Brockriede, Dimensions of the Concept of Rhetoric, 54 Q. J. SPEECH 1, 12
(1968).
Perhaps the most important single characteristic of rhetoric is that it
is a matrix of complex and interrelated variables of the kind dis-
cussed in this paper. The theorist cannot meaningfully pluck from
the system any single variable and hope to understand it apart from
the others . . . . Unfortunately for the prognosis of theoretical ad-
vances in rhetoric, the combinations and permutations of the alterna-
tives afforded by the various dimensions are so many as to approach
infinity.
1990] 679
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the process that brings about an eventual result and the
result itself. "Persuasion" is a process (persuading) and
the product (being persuaded). From the standpoint of
the person doing the persuading, the process entails the
techniques of persuading; from the standpoint of the
person being persuaded, the process embodies the motiva-
tions for belief ....
The product (persuasion), which results from the
process of persuading, consists in the resulting conviction
in the soul of the person being persuaded. It is the be-
lief engendered because of the motivations presented in
the process.'
This article is concerned with persuasion from the stand-
point of the legal advocate who is doing the persuading. For
our purposes, persuasion should be understood to involve
the manipulation of the decisions of an audience of one or
more people that can affect the achievement of a client's
objectives. The decisions at which a lawyer's persuasive ef-
forts are directed must involve some degree of uncertainty,
that is, the decision-makers must have more than one viable
alternative from which to choose.'"
1. Decisions Involving Uncertainty
Advocacy is not appropriate, nor can it succeed, where
the solution is clear to those people who control the decision
in question. Some uncertainty about the proper result of an
impending decision must exist in the minds of the
decision-makers before persuasion can occur.
Whenever two men come to opposite decisions about the
same matter, [says Descartes] one of them at least must
certainly be in the wrong, and apparently there is not
even one of them who knows; for if the reasoning of
one was sound and clear he would be able so to lay it
before the other as finally to succeed in convincing his
understanding also.'"
When a lawyer is involved in a matter in which the legal-
ly correct resolution is clear to all parties (or can be made to
11. J. KINNEAVY, GREEK RHETORICAL ORIGINS IN CHRISTIAN FAITH 22 (1987).
12. THE NEW RHETORIC, supra note 7, at 3-4.
13. THE NEW RHETORIC, supra note 7, at 2 (quoting Descartes, Rules for the
Direction of the Mind, 31 GBWW 1, 2 (1952)).
[Vol. 30680
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be clear), persuasion plays no role in the outcome. No one
deliberates where the solution is necessary or argues against
what is self-evident. 4 In such situations, the client should be
appropriately advised and litigation should either not be initi-
ated or should be quickly settled.
The important consideration in law cases is not so much
what the lawyers believe about the matter, but what the peo-
ple who will decide the outcome believe about it. As, by
definition, a lawyer engaged in advocacy is unable to prove a
case to any degree of scientific certainty, decision-makers will
base their decisions on those propositions which they are sat-
isfied to be the most credible, plausible and probable. The
decisions may be based on the actual truth of the matter,
but they may not be. 5
2. Audience
Decision-makers are the audience for a lawyer's persua-
sive efforts. The audience of a persuasive effort is best un-
derstood as the gathering of those whose decisions the law-
yer wants to influence. 6 The people who constitute the au-
dience for a persuasive effort may not be the same people
who are being directly addressed by the lawyer. For example,
the opposing party may be the target of the advocacy, not
the lawyer with whom the advocate is negotiating. Or, it may
be both the lawyer and the opposing party.
For a persuasive effort to succeed, there must be some
attention paid to it by those to whom it is directed." It is
not enough for a lawyer to speak or to write; he or she must
also be listened to or read. Knowledge about the audience is
a precondition of all effective persuasion, and knowledge of
an audience cannot be conceived independently of knowl-
14. THE NEW RHETORIC, supra note 7, at 1.
15. There are some people who are bothered by this notion. They would
prefer for the legal system and everyone who participates in it to work together
to discover the truth in every case. Even if this goal was obtainable, there would
always be cases in which the truth could not be discovered, but the dispute would
still have to be resolved. Although legal dispute resolution mechanisms do not
always produce correct results, they are vastly superior to the alternative ...
violence between the disputants.
16. Cf C. PERELMAN, supra note 7, at 14.
17. THE NEW RHETORIC, supra note 7, at 18.
1990]
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edge of how to influence it."8 In advocacy, the important
thing is not knowing what the lawyer regards as true or im-
portant, but knowing the views of the people whose deci-
sions the lawyer seeks to manipulate. 9
3. Manipulation
The lawyer who intends to become an effective advocate
must accept the reality that manipulation is an inevitable part
of the game. Unfortunately, manipulation may include an
element of unfairness, and so the image of the manipulative
lawyer is not one which is favored by the legal profession.
However, there is really no better word for describing
what advocates do, and lawyers should not pretend that they
do not manipulate. Much of the discomfort of accepting the
role of manipulation in advocacy can be avoided by adhering
to the following definition of manipulation: to control by
artful (but not unfair) means to the advantage of one's cli-
ent. Advocates who practice in accordance with this defini-
tion should feel no shame about being manipulative.
B. Images of Advocacy
One way to conceptualize advocacy is to think of it as a
competition between two lawyers who are trying to peddle
competing versions of a story to a person who must decide
which one to buy. This is an appropriate image, for a
lawyer's efforts at persuasion are guided by the same princi-
ples as a business person's efforts to sell products. Legal
advocates just happen to be in the business of selling ideas,
not merchandise.
Another illustration of legal advocacy begins with a trian-
gle. At one corner is the lawyer. At another is the audience
(judge, jury, opposing attorney, etc.). At the third corner is
the truth, that is, the reality of the subject of the persuasive
effort. [The question at issue may involve historical facts
(what happened or who did it), culpability (who is responsi-
ble for it), damages (what is it worth or how much time
should be served), or the law (what do these cases and stat-
utes really mean). It can also involve the consequences of
18. THE NEW RHETORIC, supra note 7, at 20.
19. THE NEW RHETORIC, supra note 7, at 23.
(Vol. 30
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deciding one way rather than another (e.g., if I turn down
the settlement offer will I fare better at trial).]
Somewhere inside the triangle is the message (central
thesis) to which the lawyer wants, the audience to adhere.
Success occurs if the audience holds the belief when it makes
its decision that the central thesis of the lawyer is in fact
reality (truth), or is closer to reality than any other alterna-
tive from which the audience can choose.20
In legal disputes involving third party decision-makers,
there is always more than one alternative being offered to
the audience. Thus, the illustration of legal advocacy is in-
complete. Return to the image of the triangle and add an
identical triangle, forming a diamond with a line through the
center. The lawyers are at opposite ends and the dividing
line runs between the decision-maker and reality (the center
line should be broken to indicate the decision-makers' inabili-
ty to investigate or discover the truth without relying on the
lawyers). The competing versions of the truth float in the en-
closed spaces on either side of the center line. This image of
legal advocacy will aid one's understanding of the concepts
presented in this paper.
TRUTH/ I \
LAWYER thesis I thesis LAWYER\ I /
DECISION-MAKER
C. Strategy and Tactics
Legal persuasion takes many shapes and forms. It in-
cludes overall strategy considerations (designing a litigation
plan from the initial client meeting to the ultimate conclu-
sion of the case) as well as smaller strategies and tactics
which are employed along the way. In planning an overall
strategy, a lawyer will usually anticipate numerous points at
which decisions could produce results which are satisfactory
20. The application of the basic communications triangle to classical rhetoric
is more fully explained in J. KINNEAVY, supra note 3 (Kinneavy includes a repre-
sentation of the structure of Aristotle's Rhetoric based on the communications
triangle on page 226).
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to the client. The lawyer may even need to engineer particu-
lar events at which key decisions can be made (e.g., motions
to dismiss must be filed in order to give a judge a chance to
rule on them). Tactical planning will usually relate to a
lawyer's attempt to manipulate a particular decision within an
overall strategic scheme.
Aristotle and Perelman's approaches to persuasion are
broad enough to embrace all forms of persuasion. The same
guiding principles apply to persuasive efforts about a narrow
point (negotiating the price of a widget) as to more complex
efforts at persuasion (litigating a products liability case).
Therefore, the steps outlined in this paper for designing a
plan for persuasion should have equal application to big
events as well as to small opportunities for persuasion.
III. DESIGNING A PLAN FOR PERSUASION
This article describes a method for designing a plan for
persuasion which is consistent with fundamental principles of
advocacy. An outline is set forth below. The remainder of
the article will discuss the components of each step.
Outline of Persuasion Plan
A. Specify Objectives and Options
B. Anticipate Key Decisions and Decision-Makers
C. Rank and Compare Values/Goals of Decision-Makers
D. Formulate a Thesis
E. Select Supporting Propositions
F. Marshal Proof of the Propositions (Employ all Means of
Persuasion)
1. Plan the Substance of Persuasion
a. Employ Existing Tools
i. Familiar Tools (Evidence)
ii. Procedural Devices
iii. Presumptionsiv. Values
v. Loci of the Preferable
b. Employing Existing Tools in Klare
c. Employ Creative Tools
i. Appeal to Reasoning
ii. The Personal Appeal of the Lawyer
[Vol. 30
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iii. Appeal to Emotions
d. Employing Creative Tools in Klare
i. Appeal to Reasoning
ii. The Personal Appeal of the Lawyer
iii. Appeal to Emotions
2. Plan the Presentation of Persuasion
a. Organization
b. Style •
c. Delivery
d. Memory
G. Put it all Together
H. Consider Moral Implications of the Plan
This outline may at first seem to involve too many steps
to be useful to a practicing lawyer's routine work. To be
sure, persuasion is a 'complex endeavor and an explicit analy-
sis of each component of the planning process in connection
with any persuasive effort will be a time-consuming and diffi-
cult task. Although it will aid lawyers in conducting such
in-depth planning efforts, this article should also assist law-
yers who have neither the time nor the need to do so.
An advocate does not need to plan carefully for every
persuasive effort. Some decisions are not critical for achiev-
ing the ultimate objectives of the client, and the lawyer is
often justifiably comfortable relying on instinct and experi-
ence to develop and execute an effective plan of persua-
sion. More often than not, lawyers will easily, even subcon-
sciously, accomplish most of the tasks described in the plan-
ning scheme-it tracks the natural development of a persua-
sion plan. Sometimes lawyers will get hung up on certain as-
pects, and careful thought about those issues will be worth-
while. The principles of persuasion described in this article
can assist lawyers in overcoming those obstacles, and the
outline can also be used as a checklist to ensure that all com-
21. Perhaps lawyers too quickly fool themselves into believing this when time
pressures and restricted resources force them to look for short cuts. An improved
understanding of persuasion should help lawyers make better judgments about the
need for detailed planning and reduce the risks for clients. It should also assist
the lawyer in those many situations in which a persuasion plan must be developed
and implemented instantaneously on a particular issue when there is no time for
thoughtful planning.
1990)
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ponents of persuasion have been considered.
An understanding of the basic principles of persuasion
and a general command of the method described for design-
ing persuasive efforts will help lawyers when they need to
plan thoroughly for a persuasive effort or when they simply
need to examine one or more components of a persuasion
plan, whether it is their own or their opponents'.
A. Specify Objective and Options
Setting objectives is the starting point of planning for
persuasion. The lawyer should take care to distinguish be-
tween the ultimate objectives of the case and the specific
objectives of the lawyer's persuasive efforts.
The ultimate objectives of the case are always dictated by
the client: what are the purposes for which the lawyer has
been retained (e.g., to be acquitted of the criminal charge; to
execute the contract by a certain date for a certain price; to
prevent the divorce)? A misunderstanding about a client's
objectives could result in a successful persuasive effort with
no benefit to the client (the client wants to stop the divorce;
the lawyer negotiates a very good settlement of the terms of
the divorce). In many law cases, the client will have second-
ary objectives which are to be pursued if the primary objec-
tives cannot be achieved (e.g., plea bargain for no jail time;
obtain an agreement to reconsider in six months if a con-
tract cannot be executed now; get the house as part of the
settlement if the divorce cannot be prevented).
These objectives of the case are accomplished by success-
fully completing a series of persuasive efforts which lead to
the ultimate objectives. For example, one way to obtain an
acquittal in a criminal case is to convince the prosecutor to
drop the charges. This may require first convincing the pros-
ecutor that the client is remorseful, that the client comes
from a good family, or that the case against the client is too
weak to prosecute. At the beginning of a case, the lawyer
should focus on setting the ultimate objectives of the case.
As the case progresses, the focus of the lawyer will shift
to defining and accomplishing the precise persuasive tasks
which are necessary to reach the ultimate objectives. Specifici-
ty is important. Precision in formulating the objectives of
persuasion will sometimes produce an immediate understand-
ing of the most effective routes to success. Imprecision may
[Vol. 30686
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result in misguided planning and unsatisfactory results.
A natural part of the process of setting objectives is the
concurrent identification of potential routes to success, both
legal and nonlegal. Priorities among the options should be
set in relation to time, costs, and the probability of success
of each alternative. Care should be taken to avoid eliminat-
ing any option from consideration until the lawyer is fully
satisfied that it could not help achieve any objective of the
client at any stage of the case.
As the matter proceeds, objectives, options and priorities
should be continuously reevaluated. The refinement of ob-
jectives, options and priorities must continue throughout the
duration of the case.
1. The Klare Case
As it is difficult to understand abstract concepts about
persuasion, the following hypothetical situation will be used
throughout this article to provide a context for demonstrat-
ing how to create a -plan for persuasion." Although the dis-
section of the Klare case provides only a surface analysis, it
should make the basic concepts of persuasion more under-
standable.
Assume that you and I are law partners who have been
retained by Kathe Klare. Ms. Klare, age 32, is an untenured
assistant professor at Middletown College. Last year was her
sixth and final year to obtain tenured status. The College's
tenure policy requires a candidate to have published four
scholarly articles of appropriate length in acceptable journals.
Professor Klare has published three articles which meet the
tenure standard.
Based on the acceptance of a fourth article by the Jour-
nal of Human Experience (hereinafter Journal), Klare received
the enthusiastic support of her colleagues for the award of
tenure and the petition had been forwarded to the President
of the College, Gilligan, for her review and submission to the
Board of Trustees. The Journal had promised to publish the
22. The Klare facts were created by Dean Joseph Harbaugh, University of
Richmond School of Law, and they serve as the basis for one of six negotiation
exercises in J. HARBAUGH, LAWYER NEGOTIATION TRAINING MATERIALS (1988). The
abbreviated version of the Klare facts included in this paper is used with Dean
Harbaugh's permission.
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article in an issue which was originally due to be published
two months ago.
However, some months ago, Klare received a letter from
the new editor-in-chief of the Journal, Justin, notifying her
the article would not be published by the Journal. Citing a
newly-adopted policy of producing only symposium issues of
the Journal, Justin claimed he had been unable to find two
other acceptable articles to go with Klare's and her article
would not "fit" the topic selected for the issue in which she
had expected publication. He couldn't anticipate when they
would publish a symposium which would "fit" her article.
Klare submitted the article to three other professional
journals which rejected it because of previous publication
commitments and the belief that Klare's piece would be "out
of date" at the end of the year.
Subsequently, Klare was informed that the department's
tenure recommendation was "reluctantly withdrawn." Presi-
dent Gilligan has informed Klare she would not recommend
tenure because of the department's action and the College's
four publications rule.
Klare now faces a "terminal year" at Middletown College
(which means her contract will be renewed for one year on-
ly). Her salary during her "terminal year" will be $21,500. If
she had been granted tenure, she would have been promoted
to associate professor with an $8,000 raise.
President Gilligan is sympathetic to Klare's plight, but
unyielding. The College recently adopted the "strict publica-
tion standard" for tenure following a "few unfortunate inci-
dents where tenure was awarded on expected publication
and the professor never got around to publishing the article
or book." She said Klare surpasses the tenure requirements
for teaching and service.
She admitted Klare's situation is unique but she and the
Board could not change the "inflexible rule without taking
the first step along a very slippery and dangerous slope."
However, she hinted that the "special circumstances" of the
case "might permit some slight deviation from the rule." If
Klare gets her article published in an acceptable journal be-
fore the meeting of the Board in three months, the College
would be "receptive to a petition for reconsideration" by
Kare.
Klare has received a job offer from Clarion College in
[Vol. 30
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San Francisco. Clarion offered her a three year untenured
assistant professor position at $19,500.00 per year, assuming
"an amicable separation from Middletown."
Journal is a not-for-profit corporation. Journal's insurance
policies do not include coverage in this case. The Journal is
in terrible financial shape, and faces sharply declining reve-
nues. A significant judgment against the Journal would cause
it to go out of business.
A computer problem at the printer's has caused a post-
ponement of the issue which would have contained Klare's
article for two more months, and it has pushed back the
following issue to six months from now "at the earliest." The
printing contract prohibits insertion of new material within
two months of publication, without permission of the printer.
Kathe Klare's article would cost an additional $6100.00 to
publish, if it is added to the present issue.
a. Objectives and Options in Klare
Ms. Klare has made her objectives clear. Her first priori-
ty is to stay at Middletown, preferably with tenure. If she
cannot retain her job at Middletown, she will accept the job
at Clarion, and seek compensation from the Journal. She is
not sure whether she would want to sue the University, but
she might.
We have identified the following alternatives which
might accomplish Klare's goals:
legal
1. breach of contract suit against the Journal.
2. breach of contract suit against the University.
3. sex discrimination suit against the University.
nonlegal
4. convince the University to extend the deadline.
5. convince the Journal to publish on time.
6. find another place to publish on time.
We feel that the option of finding another place to pub-
lish the article on time is impractical, but we advise Klare to
keep looking for an alternate publisher in case the University
grants more time, but the Journal cannot be made to publish
it in time to meet the new deadline. Klare does not want to
sue the University for breach of contract at the present time
68919901
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due to her personal situation, and because it might jeopar-
dize her job offer from Clarion. Our analysis of the law and
the known facts discloses no justification for filing a sex dis-
crimination suit, unless additional facts come to light (given
Klare's reluctance to sue the University, there is no immedi-
ate need to search for evidence of sex discrimination).
The only two options which would achieve Klare's first
goal of keeping her job at Middletown and which also would
avoid future trauma and expense are: convince the University
to extend the deadline or convince the Journal to publish on
time. We are undecided about the utility of filing a suit
against the Journal for breach of contract. There is virtually
no hope of obtaining an order of specific performance in
time to save Klare's job at the University, and we want to
more thoroughly assess whether a lawsuit would help or hin-
der our efforts to convince the Journal to publish on time.
B. Anticipate Key Decisions and Decision-Makers
Every persuasive effort is directed at a decision. There is
no purpose of legal advocacy other than to influence a deci-
sion which might affect the outcome of a case. People make
decisions. In a law case, the decisions which might conclude
the matter at each stage of the process and the
decision-makers who control them can be fairly easily identi-
fied. The possibilities are usually limited to the parties and
their lawyers, trial and appellate judges, and jurors. In some
cases, but not all, third parties control decisions which can
either make settlement possible or prevent the parties from
resolving the problem.
The advocate should conscientiously anticipate each of
the decisions which must be made to attain the desired re-
sults for the client, and the advocate should identify the peo-
ple who will control those decisions. Repeating this exercise
from the perspective of the other side will produce an im-
proved understanding of an opponent's objectives and the
probable decisions and decision-makers which the opponent
will try to manipulate. The lawyer can then consider how
best to keep the opponent from being successful.
1. Key Decisions and Decision-Makers in Klare
At Journal, the key decision-maker will be the
690 (Vol. 30
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editor-in-chief, Justin. For the article to get published within
three months Justin must decide to abandon the symposium
format for this issue and ask the printer to accept additional
material. Additional controlling decisions are: the printer
must decide to allow additional material to be added and
someone must decide to pay for the additional pages.
For the University, the key decision-maker will be Presi-
dent Gilligan. For the deadline to be extended she must
decide either to waive the four publications requirement
altogether (we consider this to be highly unlikely) or to waive
the time limit. If she makes the latter decision and sets a
new deadline, someone must decide to publish the article in
time. (Although it was the faculty of Klare's department who
withdrew the petition for tenure, we have learned that it will
reinstate its recommendation, if Gilligan indicates a willing-
ness to waive the rule.) President Gilligan alone controls the
decision to extend the time within which publication must
occur.
Editor Justin and President Gilligan are not presently in
a posture of needing to influence a decision-maker other
than Klare. To this point, their interests have been the same
wanting Klare to accept their decisions and leave them alone.
Their initial responses to our inquiries can be expected to be
consistent with this goal.
If Klare pursues her alternate objective, to receive com-
pensation for her damages, either someone must decide to
pay voluntarily, or compensation must be ordered by a court.
For compensation to be paid voluntarily, Editor Justin or
President Gilligan, or both, must decide that settling the case
is, on the whole, a preferable option to continuing the liti-
gation (a variety of decisions would precede this ultimate
conclusion). From their perspective, they would want Klare
to decide to drop the suit or to accept a settlement offer at
the lowest possible cost to them.
If Klare sues the Journal for breach of contract and the
case proceeds to trial, any compensation would have to be
ordered by a court. First, a judge could be faced with decid-
ing whether her pleadings state a cause of action and wheth-
er there are sufficient disputed facts to constitute a question
for a jury to decide. A judge would rule on any disputed
questions of law and either a judge or a jury would decide
the facts of the case (if disputed), which might include:
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- the existence of a contract between Klare and the Jour-
nal to publish the article by a certain date (if none ex-
ists, the case is over);
- whether the contract was breached by the Journal (if'a
contract exists, the Journal has breached it);
- whether the breach was justified or otherwise excused
(a key issue of fact may be whether Klare properly dis-
charged her editorial responsibilities);
- what damages were suffered by Klare as a result of the
breach;
- was there a duty to mitigate (issue of law for the
judge);
- if so, did she properly discharge this duty;
- how much the Journal should be required to pay Klare
to compensate for these damages (and any other relief
which might be appropriate: specific performance, costs,
attorney's fees).
The Journal's defense would be built around one or
more of the following positions: there was no contract; if
there was, it was not to publish by a certain date; Klare did
not perform her end of the bargain; she suffered no com-
pensable damages; and she failed to mitigate them.
We believe the key issue is whether or not the contract
was to publish by a certain date, but we are confident of
winning this point. We are even more confident of winning
on all the others, and we have decided to focus our atten-
tion on proving damages. Since the Journal may not be able
to survive any judgment against it, we also want to be sure
to obtain an order of specific performance to ensure publica-
tion of the article. (Publication would have some value to
Klare, especially while she remains in a teaching position
without tenure. How to avoid having the Journal go out of
business before it publishes the article is an unresolved is-
sue.)
C. Rank and Compare Values/Goals of Decision-Makers
An examination of the role of values in decision-making
is critical to understanding persuasion, because the personal
values of the decision-makers will determine the outcomes of
their decisions.
A value is a prescriptive belief that judges whether or
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not a means or an end is desirable or undesirable.3 Values
are derived from culture and they have been transmitted in
successive generations through society's institutions. Accord-
ing to Chaim Perelman, values which are accepted by all
people include justice, freedom, humanity, truth and duty.2 4
Most people in American society share common values
which reflect its Judeo-Christian heritage. 5 Milton Rokeach
has identified thirty six values which are shared by most
Americans, eighteen "terminal" values (ideal end states of
existence) and eighteen "instrumental" values (ideal modes of
behavior).26 He studied the value hierarchies of Americans
during the period 1968-1971 and discovered the following
rankings (men/women):
Terminal Values
1/1 A world at peace.
62/2 Family security.
3/3 Freedom.
4/13 A comfortable life.
5/5 Happiness.
6/6 Self-respect.
7/10 A sense of accomplishment.
8/7 Wisdom.
9/8 Equality.
Instrumental Values
1/1 Honest.
2/4 Ambitious.
3/3 Responsible.
4/5 Broadminded.
5/6 Courageous.
6/2 Forgiving.
7/7 Helpful.
8/12 Capable.
9/8 Clean.
23. See V. O'DONNELL & J. KABLE, PERSUASION: AN INTERACTIVE DEPENDENCY
APPROACH 23-24 (1982) [hereinafter PERSUASION]. (The smallest value in a
social-value system is a belief (a value being one type of belief), but values are
more manageable than beliefs when one is conducting an analysis of motivations
in decision-making because an adult may have tens or hundreds of thousands of
beliefs, but only dozens of values.) See also Sillars & Ganer, Values and Beliefs: A
Systematic Basis for Aigumentation, ADVANCES, supra, note 6, at 184, 186-87. (Values
are also generally more important to argumentative analysis than beliefs because
they are better indicators of the shared convictions of a community.).
24. C. PERELMAN, PRACTICAL REASONING IN HUMAN AFFAIRS 16 (1986) (here-
inafter PRACTICAL REASONING].
25. Rex Lee describes the shared values of lawyers in The Role of the Religious
Law School, 30 VILL. L. REV. 1175, 1183 (1985).
Most of what is good and moral in our profession and in our
broader society has religious roots that are both ancient and deep.
This includes the higher moral aspirations of our profession: love of
truth, love of justice, love of teaching and public service, and con-
cern for the welfare of others.
26. Rokeach, Change and Stability in American Value Systems 1968-1971, 38 PUB.
OPINION Q. 222 (1974). (PERSUASION, supra note 23, at 25 reports that one study
has concluded that the prime American values are power, money and sex.).
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10/11 National security. 10/11 Self-controlled.
1/9 True friendship. 11/14 Independent.
12/4 Salvation. 12/10 Cheerful.
13/12 Inner harmony. 13/13 Polite.
14/14 Mature love. 14/9 Loving.
15/16 A world of beauty. 15/16 Intellectual.
16/17 Social recognition. 16/17 Logical.
17/16 Pleasure. 17/15 Obedient.
18/18 An exciting life. 18/18 Imaginative. 7
In sum, a person's values include whatever will produce
personal satisfaction at a given moment in one's life. Aristot-
le advanced the philosophy that people make decisions which
they believe will be conducive to their greatest personal hap-
piness.
Men, individually and in common, nearly all have some
aim, in the attainment of which they choose or avoid
certain things. This aim, briefly stated is happiness and
its component parts. Therefore, for the sake of illustra-
tion, let us ascertain what happiness is, generally speak-
ing, and what its component parts consist in; for all who
exhort or dissuade discuss happiness and the things
which conduce or are detrimental to it. For one should
do the things which procure happiness or one of its
parts, or increase instead of diminishing it, and avoid
doing those things which destroy or hinder it or bring
about what is contrary to it.2 8
Pascal said, "All men whatsoever are almost always led into
belief not because a thing is proved but because it is pleas-
ing." 29
27. Id Rokeach also discovered differences in the ranking of values based on
race, age, income and education, as well as sex. See also Sillars & Ganer, supra
note 23, at 190. (Although "a world at peace" was ranked at the top during
Rokeach's survey during the Vietnam war, it was ranked no higher than eight by
college students in 1978-1982.).
28. ARISTOTLE, supra note 3, at 47.
29. THE NEW RHETORIC, supra note 7, at 61 (quoting Pascal, On Geometfical
Demonstration, Section II: Concerning the Ail of Persuasion, 33 GBWW 430, 440
(1952)). When counseling some clients, a difficult question for lawyers may be
whether a client's decision is consistent with short term happiness, but not neces-
sarily long term happiness. For example, the desire to avoid the tension of a trial
is consistent with short term satisfaction, not necessarily long term. Also, the di-
vorce client who wants to be more generous than necessary during the divorce
may regret the decision later when material possessions become more important
694 [Vol. 30
1990] PERSUASION FROM A TO P 695
Rokeach and others have learned that different people
rank their values in different orders and that these rankings
will change regularly during a person's lifetime."0 This is of
the utmost importance to lawyers, because the values of an
audience are not, in and of themselves, as important as the
manner in which the values are interrelated, that is, their
hierarchies.
Value hierarchies are, no doubt, more important to the
structure of an argument than the actual values. Most
values are indeed shared by a great number of audienc-
es, and a particular audience is characterized less by what
values it accepts than by the way it grades them.3'
"When values converge, it is the hierarchy which resolves the
conflicts between them." 2
In all cases involving persuasion, one assumes the exis-
tence of values which are accepted, though incompatible
in a certain situation; the hierarchic structure, whether it
be the result of an argumentation or has been estab-
lished from the start, will indicate which value will be
sacrificed."3
Thus, people who face similar situations will make differ-
ent choices, not because their basic values are different, but
because the ranking of values (hierarchies) varies from per-
son to person as it varies from time to time in each
individual's life. Decisions become difficult when the choice
to be made causes a conflict between two or more values of
approximately equal rank. 4
than maintaining cordial relations with the former spouse. Although it is not clear
how lawyers should proceed when faced with alternatives that produce a conflict
between long term and short term satisfaction, Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another
View of Legal Negotiation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 760, 803 (1984), does advise
lawyers to consider explicitly the short run and long run needs of the client (and
other parties) when fashioning negotiation plans.
30. PERSUASION, supra note 23, at 25-26.
31. PERSUASION, supra note 23, at 81.
32. PERSUASION, supra note 23, at 82.
33. PERSUASION, supra note 23, at 83.
34. Some decisions are justified by lawyers on the basis of role values, not
personal values. For example, the lawyer who helps a client evict an elderly tenant
on Christmas Eve justifies the action in terms of professional norms, not personal
values. Such lawyers are only avoiding an admission that their personal values had
led them to decide to comply with the professional norms which supported the
Christmas eve eviction rather than to follow professional norms which would have
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Close attention should be paid by lawyers to the person-
al values of the decision-makers they wish to influence. Re-
member, knowledge of an audience cannot be conceived
independently of the knowledge of how to influence it. 5 Of
course, it is difficult to learn enough about jurors, judges,
opposing parties, or even one's own clients to analyze their
value hierarchies accurately.36
At least in the early stages of law practice, one must rely
on indirect evidence about the values of the participants,
except for one's own client. To the extent that one can dis-
cover them or guess at them, the goals of the parties are
probably the best source of information about their values.
Therefore, advocates should articulate and rank the goals of
the decision-makers at an early stage of a dispute and should
continuously update the list as more information is obtained.
As explained earlier, the first step in the planning pro-
cess is to specify the objectives of persuasion. These objec-
tives should reflect the principal value hierarchies of the
client as they relate to the case. They provide a starting
point for creating a complete list of what the client wants to
accomplish and avoid throughout the duration of the case.
If client satisfaction and positive results are the two goals
of all client representation, a lawyer needs to understand as
fully as possible the legal, economic, psychological and social
goals of the client. Every goal of the client should be includ-
ed on the list, whether or not the lawyer believes it is realis-
tic.
justified a decision not to participate in it. In short, they believe that their per-
sonal happiness will be enhanced more by doing the act than by not doing it.
(An enlightening perspective on the interplay between role and personal values is
contained in Tom Shaffer's analysis of the factors involved when Judge Edwin
Horton, knowing it would end his judicial career, decided to set aside the jury
verdict of guilty and the pronouncement of death and order a new trial for
Haywood Patterson, following one of the Scottsboro trials in Decatur, Georgia in
1933. See T. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER 143-52 (1981).
35. PERELMAN, supra note 7, at 20.
36. This underscores the need for lawyers to utilize client-centered techniques
when helping clients reach decisions. See D. BINDER & S. PRICE, LEGAL INTER-
VIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT CENTERED APPROACH (1977). Menkel-Meadow,
supra note 29, at 802-03, points out the importance of trying to learn about one's
clients' latent (unstated) needs as well as their manifest (articulated) needs. Where-
as this is difficult enough to accomplish with one's own clients, it is considerably
more difficult to do with respect to other decision-makers in the case. However, it
is essential for effective advocacy.
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Of equal, if not greater importance is the creation of
similar lists for the decision-makers who will be the objects
of the lawyer's persuasive efforts. Knowledge of one's audi-
ence is central to effective persuasion. It is important to
understand not just the client's values and needs, but also
those of other people who control or affect key decisions,
including the lawyers.
Once the goals of the client and other decision-makers
have been predicted and tentatively ranked, the lists should
be compared. This can be a surprisingly fruitful exercise. A
comparison of the goals of all parties may reveal common
ground on which an agreement can be based, or it may iden-
tify particularly difficult or insurmountable obstacles which
make it clear that settlement or ultimate success is unlike-
ly.3
7
One should not feel completely confident with the re-
sults of this segment of the planning process. Those things
about which confidence is lacking should be noted. This will
help focus subsequent information gathering, formal as well
as informal.
If goals are identified which appear to block successful
achievement of the client's objectives, the lawyer should
search for lower ranked goals of the decision-maker which
would be consistent with success for the client. If these exist,
planning for the persuasive effort should focus on how the
lawyer can cause the decision-maker's value hierarchies to be
rearranged so that at least one of these lower ranked goals
becomes ranked higher than any goal which would block
achievement of the client's objectives.
1. Values/Goals of Decision-Makers in Klare
We have made the following lists of the key
decision-makers' goals, ranked in priority from top to bottom."8
37. In INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING AND NEGOTIATION: SKILLS FOR EFFECTIVE
REPRESENTATION 479-84 (1990), Joe Harbaugh and Bob Bastress describe a similar
process for "planning for exchange as a problem-solving negotiator." They also
suggest that each need be classified as absolutely essential, important or desirable
and that the needs of the parties be compared and labeled as shared, conflicting
or independent. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 29, describes the following process:
identify needs, search for solutions which meet needs, try to expand the resources
which are available to meet needs, and consider the justness and fairness of the
solutions.
38. Recognize that the paper attempts only a surface analysis of the parties'
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Klare wants:
1. to get tenure at Middletown
2. to get tenure at next school
3. to avoid having to leave Middletown
4. to get tenured salary
5. to avoid taking a pay cut to move
6. to get as much money as possible
7. to get the article published (as is; as modified; asap)
8. to avoid further publicity about the situation
9. to avoid uncertainty/stress of trial
10. to avoid expenses of further litigation
11. to avoid unnecessary harm to the Journal (do the right
thing)
Justin wants:
1. to keep the Journal operating
2. to avoid harm to his or the Journal's reputation
3. to maintain his authority as editor-in-chief
4. to avoid further publicity about the Klare situation
5. to pay as little as possible to Klare
6. to avoid uncertainty/stress of trial
7. to avoid expenses of further litigation
8. to avoid unnecessary harm to Klare (do the right thing)
9. to retain symposium format
Gilligan wants:
1. to have the College's rules followed
2. to avoid being sued for changing the terms of Klare's
employment after hiring Klare
3. to avoid involvement in litigation
4. to be fair to Klare
5. to retain Klare
6. to avoid adverse publicity
7. to see Klare's article published
goals for illustrative purposes. In a law suit involving real people, not hypothetical
caricatures, a lawyer can and should inquire more deeply into the values/goals
which will affect each player's decision-making. For example, some people will
have a much greater reluctance to proceed to trial than others simply because
they have a personal aversion to taking the witness stand while others will relish
the opportunity to "tell their stories" and will turn down very good settlement
offers to have that opportunity. The more a lawyer can understand the motiva-
tions of the players, the greater the likelihood of successful advocacy.
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Our next step was to compare the lists. We concluded
that the only goal of Justin which conflicts with a goal of
Klare's is the desire to pay Klare as little money as possible.
In our opinion, the only options which would avoid paying
any money to Klare are: to win at trial; to print the article
within three months; or for the University to grant more
time. The last option would satisfy all of Justin's goals, there-
fore, he should be willing to help us persuade the College to
change its rules.
The option of printing the article in a timely fashion
would achieve more of Justin's goals than going to trial,
therefore, he should be willing to explore this option, espe-
cially if the University refuses to allow more time. The only
goal which would be negatively affected by printing early is
Justin's desire to retain the symposium format, and, perhaps,
his retention of authority. We cannot be sure how strongly
Justin feels about retention of the symposium format, but we
think it is more logical to place a higher priority on staying
in business than on standing pat on the symposium issue.
Justin's primary objective is the survival of the Journal.
Its survival would be threatened by a lawsuit, for even an
unsuccessful lawsuit could cost more to defend than the Jour-
nal can afford. He wants Klare to decide not to sue the Jour-
nal. If she does sue, he will want a quick, inexpensive settle-
ment of it, or he will want litigation to be as inexpensive as
possible.
The biggest conflict between Klare's goals and Gilligan's
goals is the desire to have the College's rules followed. The
only solution which would allow this goal to be satisfied and
allow Klare to get tenure is to have the Journal publish it on
time. Before we could persuade Gilligan to recommend al-
lowing more time, we would have to find a way to rearrange
Gilligan's values hierarchy so that a goal which is consistent
with allowing more time would become ranked higher than
the goal of following the rules. Klare's feelings about
Middletown College and our need to maintain amicable rela-
tions due to the job offer from Clarion eliminate using litiga-
tion or bad publicity as a club. This leaves three goals we
can promote: be fair to Klare; retain Klare; and see Klare's
article published. We will simultaneously explore ways to
lower the ranking of her goal of adherence to the rule.
6991990]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
D. Formulate a Thesis
The first step in developing the tactics of a particular
persuasive effort is to formulate a central thesis, that is, a
proposition, a premise, a theory of the case. This thesis is
the conclusion which the lawyer wants the audience to have
reached at the time it makes its decision. It is at this stage
where the distinction becomes clear between the ultimate
objectives of the case and the particular objectives of the
advocate. The thesis will be used to advance the lawyer's
specific persuasive objective. Accomplishing that objective will
be one step toward achieving the ultimate objectives of the
case.
The thesis should be envisioned as a single declarative
sentence. It should represent what the lawyer wants the
decision-maker to believe about the matter when the persua-
sive effort is completed, that is, the thesis is the conclusion.
It should be conceptualized in terms of what the lawyer is
trying to convince the decision-maker to do or to refrain
from doing. Sometimes the thesis will be stated to the audi-
ence; sometimes the lawyer will want the audience to figure
it out for themselves.
At the beginning of the planning process, a lawyer may
not be able to form a firm idea of what the thesis should be.
In such cases, a tentative thesis or a series of alternative the-
ses should be developed. However, before the actual presen-
tation of persuasion, a single thesis should be selected. It will
lay the foundation for the persuasive effort, and it should be
clear and cogent. If the central message is fuzzy and
disunified in the lawyer's mind when advocacy begins, then it
will be fuzzy and disunified in the decision-maker's mind
when advocacy is over. More than one thesis can be ad-
vanced simultaneously, if they are consistent with each other.
In formulating a thesis, a lawyer should keep in mind
that the ultimate thesis in every case is "you will be happier
making the decision I want than any other choice available
[Vol. 30
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to you." Stated another way, this becomes "compared with
any other alternative, the decision I want you to make is
consistent with personal values that are more important to
you than those values which would point toward another
decision."
1. Potential Theses in Klare
If we are negotiating with the College to get more time
for Kare to publish, some potential theses include:
1. The rule was not intended to result in the dis-
missal of someone in Klare's situation.
2. Klare has not had a fair chance to comply with
the new rule.
3. Klare's dismissal would needlessly harm her and
cost the University a valued and loyal employee.
Potential theses for convincing the Journal to publish
Klare's article in the upcoming issue include:
1. The Journal cannot survive this litigation.
2. Publicity surrounding the litigation will not be
favorable to the Journal or to Justin.
If the suit against the Journal goes to trial, some poten-
tial theses for the jury include:
1. Kathe Klare deserves the fruits of her years of
dedication and achievement.
2. The Journal could have achieved its goals without
harming Klare.
E. Select Supporting Propositions
Reflect for a moment on the image of advocacy de-
scribed earlier in the paper (the diamond with the line down
the center, in which the decision-maker chooses between
competing versions of the truth). What the decision-maker is
doing is judging which of the theses represents the truth, or
is closer to it. A wide range of factors will affect the ultimate
decision, and the final judgment will be based on particular
factors which are selected by the audience. These will serve
as the justifications for the audience's decision.
Once selected, these justifications will be held, or ad-
hered to, in varying degrees of intensity. This adherence will
occur on "a continuum of infinite gradations and no fixed
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point of logical acceptability can be identified. The audience
alone will decide when, and to what degree, a proposed thesis
is 'justified' by the arguments being advanced in its be-
half.""9 Thus, the soundness of one's arguments and the
strength of one's persuasive efforts are entirely dependent on
the quality of the audience being addressed. Some audiences
will choose to justify their decisions on certain factors while
others will select different reasons.
According to Perelman, what keeps the behavior of audi-
ences from being haphazard and capricious is the notion that
such judgments are made "according to the Rule of Justice,
which requires that essentially similar situations be treated in
the same manner."4" Perelman's concept of normative jus-
tice is one of the guiding principles of the new rhetoric. The
advocate's task, therefore, is not to find proofs which demon-
strate the truth of propositions. Rather, the advocate must
strive to fashion arguments which serve to justify one's treat-
ment of Perelman's "essentially similar situations," or, in oth-
er words, to provide pragmatic justification for the adoption
of a belief by the audience.4 The lawyer's goal is to give
the decision-maker a good reason to accept the lawyer's the-
sis and to make the decision desired by the lawyer.
It is most important to keep in mind that it is not the
thesis which must be justified, but, rather, it is the behavior
of the decision-maker in accepting the thesis and acting on it
which must be justified.42 Therefore, it is not necessary that
the thesis be shown to be true before adherence to it is
deemed justifiable by the audience.
One need not justify those things which conform incon-
testably to accepted norms or criteria of the audience. 'Justi-
fication deals only with what can be and is being debat-
ed."4" There are many criteria on which decisions are based
39. Dearin, Justice and Justification in the New Rhetoric, PRACTICAL REASONING,
supra note 24, at 173 (1986).
40. Dearin, Justice and Justication in the New Rhetoric, PRACTICAL REASONING,
supra note 24, at 176 (quoting C. PERELMAN, JUSTICE 83 (1967).
41. Dearin, Justice and Justification in the New Rhetoric, PRACTICAL REASONING,
supra note 24, at 176.
42. Dearin, Justice and Justification in the New Rhetoric, PRACTICAL REASONING,
supra note 24, at 177.
43. Pcrelnan, Value Judgments, Justfications, and Aiguinentation, 6 PHIL. TODAY
45-51, 46 (1962).
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which do not have to be justified and from which new justifi-
cations can be built. In fact, it is through the use of the
accepted norms and criteria of the audience that the advo-
cate can persuade an audience to adhere to the central thesis
which will control the targeted decision.
The way in which an advocate causes a decision-maker to
come to the desired conclusion is by choosing as supporting
propositions of a persuasive effort theses with which the
audience already agrees." The aim is not to prove the truth
of the conclusion from these propositions, but to transfer to
the conclusion (the ultimate thesis), the adherence accorded
to the supporting propositions by the audience.45 This trans-
fer of adherence is accomplished only through the estab-
lishment of a bond between the supporting propositions al-
ready accepted by the audience and the central thesis whose
acceptance the lawyer wants to achieve.4"
Some decision-makers already believe what the lawyer
wants them to believe before advocacy begins, that is, they al-
ready accept the central thesis. The lawyer's challenge in
these cases is to strengthen their adherence to those beliefs
which support the central thesis and to prevent the opposing
lawyer from changing their minds. Other decision-makers
have formed no beliefs relevant to the matter at hand. They
await proof with no preconceptions about the outcome of
their decisions. The final category of decision-makers are
those people who have formed opinions contrary to the be-
liefs the lawyer wants them to hold. The advocate must
change the minds of these people. As Perelman sums it up,
the advocate's purpose is "to induce or to increase the
mind's adherence to the theses presented for its assent."47
There are no right or wrong propositions in any objec-
tive sense in a persuasive effort. Arguments are "as worthy as
the audience that would adhere to them,"4" that is, if the
audience accepts a proposition which will support the
lawyer's cause, it is a good proposition. In short, the ideal
persuasive effort is one that persuades the person to whom
44. C. PERELMAN, supra note 7, at 23.
45. C. PERELMAN, supra note 7, at 21.
46. C. PERELMAN, supa note 7, at 21.
47. THE NEW RHETORIC, supra note 7, at 4.
48. Fisher, Judging the Quality of Audiences and Narnrtive Rationality, PRACTICAL
REASONING, supra note 24, at 85.
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it is addressed."
Of course, if the question is not one which can be
proved to a scientific certainty (all persuasive efforts by defi-
nition), there is always something to be said in favor of the
opposing thesis and the audience may well agree more with
the propositions which support it. Thus, all arguments must
be adapted to the audience.
It is not sufficient that the starting point be considered
as true by the speakers, for, if the listeners do not admit
that it is true, they might judge that the whole argument
is built upon a petitio principii, a begging of the ques-
tion .... On the other hand, the adherence of minds,
which is the starting point and the end of every argu-
ment, occurs with variable intensity. To increase the in-
tensity of adherence is most important, because the the-
ses to which we adhere may be in conflict, in concrete
situations; it is for the most part in order to solve such
conflicts, to orient our choices, to justify our preferences,
that recourse to deliberation and to argument will take
place.5°
As a persuasive effort develops, the audience is led by
the advocate toward the desired result agreeing with the cen-
tral thesis (conclusion) of the lawyer at the time the decision
is made. This progression occurs as the lawyer presents a se-
ries of supporting propositions with which the audience
agrees, the cumulative result of which is acceptance of the
central thesis. The agreement of the audience "is sometimes
on explicit premises, sometimes on the particular connecting
links used in the argument or on the manner of using these
links: from start to finish, analysis of arguments is concerned
with what is supposed to be accepted by the hearers."5'
1. Supporting Propositions in Kare
We have tentatively identified the following propositions
in support of the thesis that "Klare should be given more
49. Cf ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC, 9 GBWW 593, 596 (1952). ("A statement is
persuasive and credible either because it is directly self-evident or because it ap-
pears to be proved from other statements that are so. In either case it is persua-
sive because there is somebody whom it persuades.").
50. Perelman, How Do We Apply Reason to Values?, 52 J. PHIL. 797, 799
(1955).
51. THE NEW RHETORIC, supra note 7, at 65.
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time because the rule was not intended to result in the dismissal
of someone in Klare's situation":
a. A rule should not be applied in a particular case
if its purpose would not be achieved. (This is the key
proposition. If President Gilligan does not agree with this
statement and cannot be convinced to agree with it, the
thesis is worthless.)
b. the purpose of the rule was to prevent people
from getting tenure who had written articles which had
not been accepted for publication and which were never
published.
c. Klare's article was accepted for publication and it
will be published at some point.
d. Klare completed her article in time to comply
with the letter of the rule.
e. Late publication was caused by unique circum-
stances which were beyond Klare's control and could not
be foreseen by her in time for the article to be pub-
lished elsewhere.
Our tentative propositions in support of the thesis that,
"the Journal should publish the article in the upcoming issue
because the Journal cannot survive this litigation" include:
a. Retention of the symposium format is not as
important as survival of the Journal (this is the key prop-
osition).
b. Klare's damages will be very high if the article is
not published in time to achieve tenure at Middletown.
c. The Journal cannot afford the costs of litigation,
even if it prevails on the merits (this would be enhanced
by a bluff that Klare is prepared to make the litigation as
complicated and expensive as possible).
d. Publishing the article is a less expensive option
than continuing the litigation.
e. It will cost no more to include the article, be-
cause Klare will pay for it to be published (if necessary).
In support of the thesis, "the jury should award damages
against the Journal because Kathe Klare deserves the fruits of her
years of dedication and achievement," we came up with:
a. People should reap the benefits of their labor.
b. Kathe Klare worked diligently for years to meet
the University's criteria for tenure.
c. She would have been awarded tenure if she had
published a fourth article before the deadline.
1990]
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d. The Journal promised to publish the fourth article
before the deadline.
e. The Journal broke its promise without sufficient
justification.
f. The Journal should pay Kathe Klare an amount of
money which fairly compensates her for the lost benefits
of her labor.
F. Marshal Proof of the Propositions (Employ all Means of
Persuasion)
Once the theses and supporting propositions have been
at least tentatively identified, the lawyer needs to consider
how to promote the audience's agreement and adherence to
them, that is, how to prove the propositions. Persuasive
proof is not the same as legal proof. Legal proof concerns
itself with a limited type of information which is presented
to a judge or jury through prescribed procedures. Persuasive
proof can involve all types of information and all methods of
presentation. There are no rules, except those chosen by the
advocate after considering the occasion, the subject, the audi-
ence, and the advocate's personal characteristics.
The reasons for success or failure as an advocate are
seldom obvious.5 There are many ways to influence deci-
sions, and the lawyer should not overlook any angle during
the preparation of a persuasive effort. Consistent success can
only be achieved by employing all available means of persua-
sion.
Lawyers should avoid habitual reliance on one compo-
nent of persuasion and should strive, instead, to use the full
range of devices which are available to aid the advocate. This
will help the lawyer master a range of approaches to advoca-
cy and avoid the tendency of some lawyers to develop inflexi-
ble methods which characterize their persuasive efforts
52. Lawyers do usually understand why cases are won or lost. Few cases are
equally balanced and lawyers and clients may be disappointed, but they should not
be surprised, to lose when the facts and the law favor the other side. However,
when the lawyer makes a serious attempt to be persuasive on a particular point,
but fails, there is no reliable way to learn why that effort did not succeed. As
there is Usually no one who can provide adequate feedback, the ability to reflect
on experience may be one of the most important lawyering skills. Lawyers inter-
ested in improving this skill should read C. ARGYRIS & D. SCHON, THEORY IN
PRACTICE: INCREASING PROFESSIONAL EFFECTIVENESS (1974) and D. SCHON, THE
REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: How PROFESSIONALS THINK IN ACTION (1983).
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throughout their careers. If there is one lesson to be learned
from classical rhetoric, it is the importance of fashioning
one's presentations to suit the particular audience and cir-
cumstances at hand. The lawyer who fails to heed this lesson
is practicing law at a disadvantage to those who do."
There are two basic segments in a persuasion plan: the
content of the lawyer's message (substance) and the manner
in which the message is communicated to the decision-maker
(presentation). 4 The lawyer who devises brilliant arguments
but gives no attention to presenting those arguments effec-
tively is just as incomplete an advocate as the lawyer who is a
highly skilled communicator with no persuasive message to
convey.
1. Plan the Substance of Persuasion
There is no magical formula for discovering the best
arguments in a given situation. There is no substitute for the
insights and genius of the human mind. In some law cases,
sound propositions are fairly obvious. On other occasions,
good theses and supporting propositions never surface
(sometimes for good reason). A careful preliminary analysis
of the case will usually produce several potentially successful
theses. Careful planning of the content and presentation of
the effort will refine those theses and produce more ideas.
The lawyer is aided in the search for good arguments by
giving close consideration to planning how to use the tools
of the advocate's craft: those things which exist or can be
produced independent of the lawyer's creativity (existing
tools) and those things which are dependent on it (creative tools).
53. This requires a large amount of effort and skill. It may be the lawyer's
equivalent of switch hitting in baseball. It is hard enough for a lawyer to find one
approach to lawyering which is comfortable and consistently rewarding. Mastery of
any approach to lawyering is an elusive goal, and lawyers are understandably
reluctant to abandon a method they've practiced to try out a new approach.
Although there are risks involved, every lawyer who wants to be the most effective
advocate possible should examine each opportunity for persuasion and should
consider whether the usual approach is the most appropriate way to handle it.
54. Rhetoricians use res and verba to describe the major divisions of rhetoric.
Res involves that component in which "invention" of arguments occurs (what is
said), and verba is concerned with "style" and "delivery" (how it is said).
55. This basic division was recognized by the classical rhetoricians. Cf ARIS-
TOTLE, supra note 3, at 15.
As for proofs, some are inartificial, others artificial. By the former I
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a. Employ Existing Tools
i. Familiar Tools (Evidence)
At the advocate's disposal in every case are tools which
exist or can be produced independent of the lawyer's creativ-
ity.
For the most part, these devices are familiar to every
lawyer: witnesses, laws in their myriad forms, documents, and
other exhibits. At the trial stage, these constitute the evi-
dence upon which the judge or jury will justify its decision.
Legal education focuses on the use of these tools.
Materials which teach lawyers how to construct a theory
of the case concentrate almost exclusively on how an advo-
cate can utilize the known (or provable) facts of a case.
56
This emphasis on facts makes some sense, especially in trial
and appellate situations where the lawyer's ability to use oth-
er tools is somewhat restricted. However, even in those con-
texts, the lawyer should not overlook the availability of other
tools which can help persuade the audience. This becomes
even more important in developing overall litigation strate-
gies and in planning negotiation sessions in which the moti-
understand all those which have not been furnished by ourselves but
were already in existence, such as witnesses, tortures, contracts, and
the like; by the latter, all that can be constructed by system and by
our own efforts. Thus, we have only to make use of the former,
whereas we must invent the latter.
"Inartistic" and "artistic" are interchangeable with "inartificial" and "artificial."
56. Cf G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS 306 (1978)
(quoting from VETrER, SUCCESSFUL CIVIL LITIGATION 27 (1977).
Successful theories regardless of type share certain features. Six of
these features have become bench marks for working up a winning
theory for a particular case. First, the theory must have a firm foun-
dation in strong facts and the fair inferences to be drawn from the
facts. Second, if possible, the theory should be built around the
so-called "high cards" of litigation, incontestable or virtually incontest-
able facts . . . . Third, and as a corollary of the second bench mark,
the theory should not be inconsistent with, or fly in the face of, in-
contestable facts. Fourth, the theory should explain away in a plausible
manner as many unfavorable facts as it can. Fifth, the theory should
be down-to-earth and have a common-sense appeal. It must be accept-
able to a jury . . . . Sixth, the theory cannot be based on wishful
thinking about any phase of the case.
(emphasis added).
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vation to settle may have nothing to do with the facts of the
case or the probability of winning at trial.
It is also important to keep in mind that many facts are
not uncontestable and the lawyer is unable to use a "fact" as
stable data to support a central thesis once it has been con-
tested by someone. The most effective way to disqualify a
fact is to show its incompatibility with other facts which are
more certainly established, preferably with a bundle of facts
which the audience is not ready to abandon. To reestablish
the status of a challenged fact, the lawyer must show that the
person who contests it is mistaken or, at least, show that
there is no reason to take the latter's opinion into ac-
count-that is, by disqualifying that person by denying that
person the status of a competent and reasonable interlocu-
tor.57
The lawyer should keep in mind the distinction between
demonstrative proof and rhetorical proof. If the facts and
law in a given case allow the lawyer to demonstrate conclu-
sively the correctness of a given position, the audience will
have been convinced by demonstrative proof. This paper is
concerned primarily with the use of rhetorical proof which
presumes the inability of either side of an issue to rely on
demonstrative proof, except insofar as it tends to support the
central thesis being advanced by the lawyer.
ii. Procedural Devices
Procedure books generally focus on the official purposes
of the rules of procedure (to gather information, to allow or-
derly processing of disputes, to assure equal treatment of
disputants), and they do not generally discuss the use of
procedural devices to influence decision-makers. However, it
is clear that modern law practitioners have not overlooked
the value of procedural devices as persuasive tools.58
It would be naive to suggest that much of discovery
practice is not carried out to create leverage and enhance
efforts to persuade opponents (and courts). Aristotle includ-
57. C. PERELMAN, supra note 7, at 23-24.
58. Cf Sayler, Rambo Litigation: Why Hardball Tactics Don't Work, A.B.A J. 79,
(Mar. 1, 1988); Crouch, The Matter of Bombe: Unfair Tactics and the Problem of
Defining Unethical Behavior in Divorce Litigation, 20 FAM. L.Q. 413 (1986).
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ed torture in his list of the tools of persuasion. 59 The mod-
ern lawyer is not likely to encounter many occasions on
which physical torture can be used to persuade
decision-makers. However, lawyers often use the discovery
process as a form of psychological torture. Their purpose is
not to gather information or simplify their cases. Instead, the
goal is to convince opponents to drop cases or to settle on
terms favorable to their clients. The effectiveness of this prac-
tice is directly related to the oppressiveness and intrusiveness
of the discovery methods employed. Until an effective means
of controlling discovery abuses can be found, this practice
will continue, for it not only enhances persuasive efforts, it
also increases billable hours.
The phrase "nuisance value" applies to those situations
in which a defendant decides to offer some money to the
plaintiff, even though the defendant is confident of the prob-
ability of success at trial. The defendant may want to avoid
the cost of litigation, negative publicity, or simply the aggra-
vation of leaving the dispute unsettled.
iii. Presumptiom
All lawyers rely on presumptions in persuasion, although
they are not usually incorporated into persuasion strategies
in the same way as other existing tools. Presumptions are im-
portant because presumed facts are given the same weight by
a decision-maker as observed, incontestable facts, although
they are not presented as evidence and may not be explicitly
mentioned during a persuasive effort. Presumptions are the
bases, or starting points of argument."0
The primary role played by precedents in legal reasoning
can be accounted for on the basis of the doctrine of pre-
sumption, which is a manifestation of the law of inertia.6'
Legal advocates rely on presumptions of man as well as on
legal presumptions. Some common presumptions of man are
the presumption that the quality of an act reveals the quality
of the person responsible for it; the presumption of natural
trustfulness by which our first reaction is to accept what
59. See supra note 55.
60. Dearin, supra note 39, at 168.
61. Dearin, supra note 39, at 167.
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someone tells us as being true, which is accepted as long and
insofar as we have no cause for distrust; the presumption of
interest leading us to conclude that any statement brought to
our knowledge is supposed to be of interest to us; and the
presumption concerning the sensible character of any human
action. 6
2
Presumptions are based on the idea that that which hap-
pens is normal and likely.63 Until there is proof to the con-
trary, it is presumed that the normal will occur, or has oc-
curred, or rather that the normal can safely be taken as a
foundation in reasoning. Presumptions create a continuity of
thought and action which, if accepted by one's audience, do
not have to be justified, or even stated, in order to rely on
them in advocacy. "Only change requires justification, pre-
sumption playing in favor of what exists, just as the burden
of proof falls upon him who wants to change an established
state of affairs."64
The adherents of a presumption require of it no justifi-
cation, but demand proofs of those who would challenge it.
The person who wants to oppose the application of a pre-
sumption has the burden of proof in challenging its applica-
bility.6 '5 Disagreements about presumptions focus on wheth-
er or not a presumption is applicable to a given set of cir-
cumstances, given the facts of the case.
[I]t is nevertheless useful to clarify the usual concept of
"normal" by showing that it always depends on a refer-
ence group, that is, on the whole category for whose
benefit it was established. It is to be observed that this
group-which is often a social group-is hardly ever ex-
plicitly described, perhaps because interlocutors rarely
think about it; it is clear, however, that all presumptions
based on what is normal imply agreement on this ref-
erence group. 66
Reference groups are unstable and the conduct of mem-
bers of the group may modify the norms. They can also be
viewed in a variety of ways: how they are expected to act,
62. THE NEW RHETORIC, supra note 7, at 70-71.
63. C. PERELMAN, supra note 7, at 25.
64. Dearin, supra note 39, at 167 (quoting C. PERELMAN, JUSTICE 104 (1962)).
65. Dearin, supra note 39, at 169.
66. THE NEW RHETORIC, supra note 7, at 72.
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how they think, how spokespeople for the group act or
think, or what opinions they hold in common.
Variations in the reference group enter into all legal
argument. The longstanding opposition between argu-
ment from the motives of the crime and argument from
the conduct of the accused corresponds to two different
reference groups. The reference group relating to mo-
tives is wider; that relating to conduct is more specific in
the sense that the presumptions are derived from what is
normal for men who, all their life, have behaved like the
accused.67
Lawyers must be sensitive to the current myths and con-
ventions of society, for all persuasion must relate to them
just as it must relate to the peculiarities of each
decision-maker. Flags, anthems, ceremonials, demonstrations,
God, revolution, class struggle, capitalism, communism, all
have particular, fluid meanings to each audience which serve
as the basis for certain assumptions.
The perception of the acute relevance of the cultural
myths to the needs and desires of a particular audience
at a precise moment in history is the sign of the genius
of the persuader. The geniuses of Madison Avenue are
the people who can tell that the large and ornate auto-
mobiles of Detroit are no longer appealing to significant
segments of the consumer populace-are no longer a part
of their "miranda"-and must be replaced with Volkswag-
ens or Fiats or Falcons."
iv. Values
Values are included in the list of the existing tools, for
they exist independent of the imagination of the lawyer and
can be used to manipulate decisions. They were discussed in
an earlier section to highlight their importance and unique-
ness and to illustrate their role in the development of the
central thesis of the advocate. Values are also useful in plan-
ning the selection and presentation of supporting proposi-
tions, particularly if the lawyer has a sufficient understanding
of the decision-maker's value hierarchies to be able to distin-
67. THE NEW RHETORIC, supra note 7, at 72-73.
68. J. KINNEAVY, supra note 3, at 280-81.
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guish the values of the person as an individual from the
values of the person as a member of a group. If so, the law-
yer can avoid the mistake of relying on presumptions or
stereotypes which do not fit the particular decision-maker.
v. Loci of the Preferable
Classical rhetoricians created storehouses of generic argu-
ments which could be drawn upon whenever they ran short
of ideas. These storehouses were called "topics" and they
were used during the process of discovering the content of
arguments, i.e., the process of "invention." Basically, the "top-
ics" were stereotyped arguments which were supposed to
seem plausible to the audience. Aristotle's "topics" have not
stood the test of time, because "each age and culture must
reformulate its own topics; this has not been systematically
done by anyone for any culture since the time of Aristot-
le."6 9
Although Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca do not systemati-
cally reformulate the topics in The New Rhetoric, they do dis-
cuss them, using the term loci. Loci "form an indispensable
arsenal on which a person wishing to persuade another will
have to draw, whether he likes it or not .... [A]ll audienc-
es, of all kinds, have to take 'loci' into account."70
Loci operate similarly to presumptions, except that they
are based on values rather than facts. They presuppose that
there are certain acts, beliefs and values which at a given
moment are accepted without argument by an audience;
hence there is no need to justify them. 71 These express the
preferences of the community and serve to direct or guide
decision-making about matters of practical reasoning.
Perelman distinguishes between general loci, which are
affirmations about what is presumed to be of higher value in
any circumstance whatsoever, and special loci, which concern
what is preferable in specific situations.7 1
We state the general loci of quantity when we assert that
what is good for the greatest number is preferable to
69. J. KINNEAVY, supra note 3, at 249.
70. THE NEW RHETORIC, supra note 7, at 84-85.
71. McKerrow, Pragmatic Justification and Perelman's Philosophical Rhetoric,
PRACTICAL REASONING, supra note 24, at 216.
72. C. PERELMAN, supra note 7, at 29-30.
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what profits only a few; that the durable is preferable to
the fragile; or that something useful in varied situations
is preferable to something that is of use in highly specific
ones. If we give as our reason for preferring something
that it is unique, rare, irreplaceable, or that it can never
happen again (carpe diem), we are stating the general
locus of quality. It is a locus that favors the elite over the
mass, the exceptional over the normal; that values what
is difficult, what must be done at the very moment, what
is immediate. The general locus quantity characterizes the
classical spirit, that of quality the romantic. 3
The advocate should realize that all persuasion relies to
some extent on the utilization of loci of the preferable. The
ongoing research in this area will certainly produce improved
understandings about their nature and their function in advo-
cacy.7
4
b. Employing Existing Tools in Klare
Let's consider the existing tools which will support our
thesis that "the Journal cannot survive this litigation." Assume
we are preparing to negotiate with Justin and his attorney.
Our planning should examine this from two perspectives.
First, what tools exist to help convince Justin and his attor-
ney that the Journal cannot survive litigation, and, second,
what tools exist to help convince them that the verdict at
trial will ruin the Journal.
First, if our goal is to convince them that the Journal
cannot survive this litigation, there are not many existing
tools which come into play. Yes, we have decided to sue the
Journal for breach of contract, primarily as a procedural device
to increase Justin's fear of the Journal going out of business
and to pressure him to forgo the symposium format in the
upcoming issue. Filing the suit is inconsistent with one of
Klare's goals (avoid costs), but it is relatively inexpensive just
to file the lawsuit. If we have correctly predicted Justin's
values and his lawyer agrees with our analysis that Klare will
73. C. PERELMAN, supra note 7, at 30.
74. As an in-depth consideration of loci or "topics" is beyond the scope of
this paper, the reader who wishes to learn more about them should refer to THE
NEW RHETORIC, supra note 7, at 83-99; E. CORBETT, supra note 3, at. 107-298; J.
KINNEAVY, supra note 3, at 245-50.
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win the lawsuit, settlement should occur quickly, if the op-
tion is administratively practical (that is, if the printer agrees
to accept more material). Klare has authorized us to pay for
the cost of printing the article, if we cannot convince the
Journal to pay for it.
a. Retention of the symposium format is not as impor-
tant as survival of the Journal (this is the key proposition).
We are relying on our beliefs about Justin's value hierar-
chy.
b. Klare's damages will be very high if the article is not
published in time to achieve tenure at Middletown.
We can use the terms of the offer from Clarion and docu-
mentation from Middletown which explains what her salary
will be if she achieves tenure. It would not hurt to have a
chart which maps out the differential over the next twenty
years or so. Legal research should develop what the legal stan-
dard is in this jurisdiction for calculating damages in this
kind of case.
c. The Journal cannot afford the costs of litigation, even
if it prevails on the merits (this would be enhanced by a
bluff that Klare is prepared to make the litigation as compli-
cated and expensive as possible).
At this point, we are relying on information that the
Journal is "in terrible financial shape." Formal or informal dis-
covery may enable us to learn more about the details of the
Journal's financial plight. However, formal discovery also pro-
vides a procedural device which can be used to increase the
costs of litigation and hasten the demise of the Journal. Of
course, our goal is to force them to settle, not to actually
incur the costs, for that would reduce the assets from which
they could pay for publication or for Klare's damages. Also,
Klare has no intention of paying us for extensive discovery.
Therefore, it is only the threat of this device which we can
use against the Journal. (Threats are not existing tools, they
are creative tools which are discussed in the next section.)
d. Publishing the article is a less expensive option than
continuing the litigation.
Here, we might want to prepare some documents which
compare the costs of publication to the costs of litigation.
e. (if necessary) It will cost no more to include the arti-
cle, because Klare will pay for it to be published.
The tool here will be our statements to the Journal. On
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the other hand, if our goal is to convince them that the Jour-
nal will be destroyed by the size of the trial verdict, we must
convince Justin and his attorney of the likelihood of our
winning at trial. Let's examine the existing tools which are
available to increase adherence to the propositions which
support our thesis that a trial verdict will destroy the Journal
because Kathe Klare deserves the fruits of her years of dedicated
work and achievement.
a. People should receive the benefits of their labor.
This represents (we hope) shared values of the jurors.
We will try to strengthen their adherence to this proposition
through our statements to the jury and by showing its consis-
tency with the laws which are applicable to this case.
b. Kathe Klare worked diligently for years to meet the
University's criteria for tenure.
Kathe Klare's testimony and that of others who are famil-
iar with her work will be our key tools to prove this proposi-
tion.
c. She would have been awarded tenure if she had pub-
lished a fourth article before the deadline.
Kathe Klare's department chairman and President
Gilligan will testify to this.
d. The Journal promised to publish the fourth article
before the deadline.
The correspondence between Kathe and the Journal will be
our primary tool. The law will determine whether a contract
existed, and this question may be decided by the trial judge,
if the facts are not in dispute. If the documents are inconclu-
sive and testimony is allowed about the parties' intentions, the
jury will decide disputed issues of fact. (If needed, an expert
witness will testify that it is normal practice for journals to
publish articles in less time than Kathe had between accep-
tance and the deadline she faced.)
e. The Journal broke its promise without sufficient
justification.
It is uncontested that the Journal did not publish the
article. The definition of "sufficient justification" will be a
matter of law which the judge will charge to the jury. The
burden will be on the Journal to meet the legal standard. An
expert witness will testify that the normal practice is to publish
articles once they are accepted unless a journal goes out of
business or is otherwise incapable of meeting its commit-
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ment.
f. The Journal should pay Kathe Klare an amount of
money which fairly compensates her for the lost benefits of
her labor.
Our tool is the law as charged by the trial judge. It will
define the parameters of the jury's discretion and responsibil-
ity in this area. We are relying on a presumption that the jury
will follow the judge's instructions, including the charges on
the law.
c. Employ Creative Tools
Once the existing tools have been identified and their
potential impact on decision-makers has been analyzed, the
lawyer should consider how to use each of the tools of per-
suasion which would not exist but for the imagination and
inventiveness of the lawyer.7
5
It is the use of the creative tools of lawyering which
distinguishes one lawyer from another. The existing tools are
unique to each case, but the creative tools are unique to
each lawyer. No two lawyers apply precisely the same quali-
ties to any persuasive effort.
The creative tools affect decisions in three ways: by influ-
encing the decision-maker's reasoning, by influencing the
decision-maker's personal reaction to the lawyer or the client,
and by influencing the decision-maker's emotions.7"
i. Appeal to Reasoning
Lawyers engaged in a persuasive effort do not have the
luxury of using either demonstrative proof or formal logic to
prove their points conclusively. However, logic does play a
75. This is not to be confused with the subject of creative thinking, including
how to think creatively about how to use existing tools. Creative thinking has
become a subject of growing interest and many materials exist on the topic,
including two which include extensive bibliographies: R. W. WEISBERG, CREATIVITY:
GENIUS AND OTHER MATTERS (1986) A. B. VANGURNDY, 108 WAYS TO GET A
BRIGHT IDEA AND INCREASE YOUR CREATIVE POTENTIAL (1983).
76. Cf ARISTOTLE, supra note 3, at 17. ("Now the proofs furnished by the
speech are of three kinds. The first, depends upon the moral character of the
speaker, the second upon putting the hearer into a certain frame of mind, the
third upon the speech itself, in so far as it proves or seems to prove."). These
constitute the ethical appeal (ethos), the emotional appeal (pathos) and the ratio-
nal appeal (logos).
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role in legal advocacy. "[P]ersuasion has to do with the 'plau-
sible,' with apparent proof and seeming logic . . . "" Rheto-
ric deals with the "approximately true.""8 The probability of
rhetoric has been called a "seeming" probability.7 9 Accord-
ing to Aristotle, man only thinks he is rational; he is per-
suaded by the appearance of rationality.8 0
In advocacy, arguments are not expected to withstand
scrutiny by what is called the logic of imperatives or deontic
logic. The key is whether the decision-maker believes it to be
logical. That is, the argument must appear to be rational to
the decision-maker, not to a universal audience. This under-
scores again the need for the lawyer to understand the audi-
ence.
People reason either deductively or inductively, either
drawing conclusions from affirmative or negative statements
or making generalizations after observing a number of simi-
lar facts.8 In logic, the deductive mode of arguing is com-
monly referred to by the term, syllogism. In rhetoric, the
equivalent of the syllogism is the enthymeme. The rhetorical
equivalent of full induction in logic is the example. Exam-
ples, and especially enthymemes, are particularly effective in
helping create an appearance of logical soundness.
The syllogism reasons from statements or propositions
that are called "premises."82 A syllogism has major premise
and a minor premise which lead to a necessary and true
conclusion. It follows this course: if a is true, and b is true,
then c must be true. The classic syllogism is:
All men are mortal beings. (major premise)
Socrates is a man. (minor premise)
Therefore, Socrates is a mortal being (true conclusion).
Analytical reasoning deals with truth; dialectical reason-
ing with justifiable opinion.8" In dialectical reasoning the
interaction between the speaker and the respondent vocally
77. J. KINNEAVY, supra note 3, at 220.
78. J. KINNEAVY, supra note 3, at 219.
79. J. KINNEAVY, supra note 3, at 219.
80. J. KINNEAVY, supra note 3, at 245.
81. E. CORBETT, supra note 3, at 34.
82. E. CORBETr, supra note 3, at 56.
83. C. PERELMAN, supra note 7, at 3.
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contribute premises for the construction of dialectical syllo-
gisms."
In rhetoric, the speaker uses the enthymeme instead of
the question and answer to achieve interaction with the audi-
ence. "The speaker draws the premises for his proofs from
propositions which members of the his audience would sup-
ply if he were to proceed by question and answer, and the
syllogisms produced in this way are enthymemes."85 The
speaker leaves out one or several of the parts of the strict
syllogism (premises or conclusion). By allowing the audience
to fill in the missing components of a deduction, the power
of suggestion is enlisted in the cause of persuasion.86
Thus, enthymemes occur only when speaker and audi-
ence jointly produce them. This creates an intimate union
between speaker and audience and provides the strongest
possible proofs.8 7
The aim of rhetorical discourse is persuasion; since rhe-
torical arguments, or enthymemes, are formed out of
premises supplied by the audience, they have the virtue
of being self-persuasive. Owing to the skill of the speak-
er, the audience itself helps construct the proofs by which it is
persuaded.8
The goal for a lawyer, then, is to omit whatever premis-
es the decision-makers can infer without trouble and give
only those parts of arguments that are needed to make it
clear.8 9 The problem, of course, is that it is very difficult to
know the audience well enough to predict what premises it
will supply, if the lawyer omits them.
ii. The Personal Appeal of the Lawyer
The importance of the decision-maker's personal reaction
to the lawyer cannot be underestimated. Perhaps the person-
al appeal of the lawyer should not be a factor in
decision-making which will affect the rights of third parties,
84. Bitzer, Aristotle's Enthymeme Revisited, 45 Q.J. SPEECH 399, 407 (1959).
85. Id. at 408.
86. J. KINNEAVY, supra note 3, at 251.
87. Bitzer, supra note 84, at 408.
88. Bitzer, supra note 84, at 408.
89. Mudd, The Enthymeme and Logical Validity, 45 Q.J. SPEECH 409, 410
(1959).
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but it always has been and it will be in the future. So long as
human beings are making decisions, they will be affected by
the personal characteristics of people who are trying to in-
fluence their decisions.
In order to maximize the impact of the personal appeal
on the audience, the lawyer must demonstrate three charac-
teristics during a presentation:
First, the lawyer must appear to have a practical knowl-
edge about the topic (good sense). The audience must be-
lieve the lawyer has good sense, a manifest ability to make
practical decisions. This derives from the self-assurance and
knowledgeableness of the lawyer. Snobbery or condescension
will have a negative effect.
Second, the advocate must seem to have the good of the
audience at heart (good will). The lawyer must identify with
the audience somehow: share their aspirations, speak their
language in some respects, and share their biases and preju-
dices, if necessary.
Third, the lawyer must portray himself or herself as a
person who would not deceive the decision-maker in the
matter at hand (good moral character). The advocate must
give evidence of sincerity and trustworthiness in the state-
ments. Assuming frankness and candor will help.
In some cases, it is difficult or impossible for a lawyer to
exhibit these characteristics. For example, when a lawyer is
negotiating the settlement of a personal injury claim, it is
hard to convince an opponent that the lawyer has the good
of the opposing attorney or the opposing party at heart.
However, lawyers should try to enhance the existence of
these characteristics in themselves whenever possible and
should always try to avoid becoming viewed by a
decision-maker as possessing their opposite traits.9°
Some modern research challenges Aristotle's claim that
the personal appeal of the advocate is the most important
and effective form of argument, but it is unquestionably an
90. While it is probably true that skilled lawyers can fake having the char-
acteristics of good sense, good moral character, and good will in some cases, it is
also probably true that it is more difficult to do than they believe. Meanness and
aggressiveness are sometimes effective (emotional appeal), thus, it is possible for
lawyers to achieve success even if they sacrifice evidence of good will and good
character. However, the cost of this loss should be weighed against the benefits of
obnoxiousness.
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important aspect of persuasion.
iii. Appeal to Emotions
The emotional appeal plays a vital part in the persuasive
process. While arguments produce beliefs about the condu-
civeness of the means to the desired end, it is the emotions
which make the ends seem desirable.9 It is this desire, or
will, which moves people -to action.
Emotional appeals account for a large portion of mod-
ern persuasive techniques. Billboards along the highway, tele-
vision ad spots, magazines, salesmen and politicians all ex-
ploit emotions in modern persuasion.92 Mother love, sex
appeal and chauvinism are among the appeals to our emo-
tions which we encounter practically every day.
Emotions are not under the direct control of conscious
thought, but conscious thought and resulting action can cer-
tainly be governed by the will. People cannot will themselves
to feel an emotion, as they will themselves to think analytical-
ly or to recall memories. Emotions are produced when peo-
ple think about something that stirs them. Thus, emotions
must be aroused indirectly. 3
The lawyer's goal is to cause a decision-maker to feel
emotions which will lead to the decision desired by the law-
yer. Lawyers who wish to arouse emotions must do so by
describing scenes or people or events which will stimulate
the desired emotion. It is essential to be specific. General
notions and abstract schemes have hardly any effect on the
imagination. The more specific the terms, the sharper the
image they conjure up, and, conversely, the more general the
terms, the weaker the image. 4 To influence the will, the
proposed object should appear desirable and the means sug-
gested should be proved to be conducive to the attainment
of that object.
Some believe that to stir the emotions of others, it is
necessary to feel those emotions oneself. 5 Empathy is essen-
tial. A lawyer must feel the feeling he or she wishes to pro-
91. E. CORBETT, supra note 3, at 100.
92. J. KINNEAVY, supra note 3, at 243.
93. E. CORBETr, supra note 3, at 100.
94. THE NEW RHETORIC, supra note 7, at 147.
95. See Hanley, Biush Up Your Aristotle, LITIGATION 39, 68 (Winter 1986).
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duce in the minds of decision-makers.
Knowledge of the audience is once again a critical factor
in the success of persuasion. The lawyer must understand the
present emotions of the decision-makers, what emotions are
most likely to cause them to make the preferred decision,
and how to produce the desired emotions in them. To
arouse anger, for example, Aristotle said we must always
know three things: the state of mind of angry people, the
people with whom they get angry, and the grounds on which
they get angry."
Aristotle's analysis of emotions was withoui benefit of
modern psychology, but our understanding of the emotional
appeal and its effect on persuasion is still at a common sense
stage of development. There has been very little scientific
inquiry into the subject, although there has been no dispute
about the powerful impact which emotions can have on deci-
sions.
d. Employing Creative Tools in Klare
Assume that we are preparing to negotiate with the Jour-
nal, and that our goal is to convince Justin and his attorney
to publish Klare's article in the next issue because the litiga-
tion will put the Journal out of business.
i. Appeal to Reasoning
Examples are useful. Justin's lawyer should already be
aware of the results of similar cases. If not, we can provide
them. References to other cases can provide examples of the
amounts of jury awards as well as examples of similar facts
which resulted in favorable verdicts for Klare's side. Justin's
lawyer also shares a common base of information about ex-
penses associated with litigation. If we know the predilections
of the trial judge or jurors in cases like this one (and they
are helpful to our side), we should use them as examples.
If put into the form of a syllogism, our primary argument
would go something like this:
The Journal wants to stay in business. Continued litiga-
tion will put it out of business. Therefore, it should agree to
publish the article.
96. See J. KINNFAVY, supra note 3, at 242.
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Only the second premise is debatable. Our argument in
support of it would be: The Journal will go out of business if
this litigation is expensive. We will make sure that the litiga-
tion is expensive. Therefore, continued litigation will put it
out of business.
The second premise in this statement is a bluff. If we
decide not to use the bluff, or it is called, our fallback pri-
mary argument is: The Journal wants to stay in business. A
trial verdict would put it out of business. Therefore, the Jour-
nal should agree to publish the article.
The argument in support of the second premise can be
stated as follows: The Journal will go out of business if it is
ordered to pay a judgment over a certain amount. It would
be ordered to pay over that certain amount. Therefore, a
trial verdict would put it out of business.
As explained in the text, effective advocates would not
couch their arguments in the form of syllogisms. Enthymemes
are more effective. Thus, we would want to produce these
syllogisms in the minds of Justin and his attorney through
our discussions with them. If we are correct in assuming that
the continuation of the Journal is their primary interest, the
key to our success lies in convincing them either that "we
will make sure that the litigation is expensive" or that "the
Journal would be ordered to pay more than the amount it
would take to put it out of business." If we can convince
them of this, the conclusions we want them to reach should
form in their minds. Additional syllogisms could be con-
structed to provide a more in-depth analysis of how to bring
the Journal's representatives to these conclusions.
ii. The Personal Appeal of the Lawyer
We lose some ethical appeal (good intentions . . . I have
your best interests at heart) by threatening to put the Journal
out of business. However, it may be possible to salvage it by
offering a settlement opportunity which will avoid this result
and which will support as many other values of the Journal
as possible. The only value which cannot be saved in our
plan is Justin's interest in printing only in a symposium for-
mat. We can try to accommodate that objective, too, by
pointing out that the planned symposium is not affected by
adding Klare's article, especially if it is separated with a no-
tice that this is a special bonus provided at no extra cost to
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purchasers of the Journal and by explaining that it had to be
printed now or it would have been out of date. Perhaps, it
could even be presented as a preview of a forthcoming sym-
posium issue on that topic.
We also lose some ethical appeal (good intentions and
good character ... you can trust us) if we get called on a
bluff to run up the expenses of the litigation to force settle-
ment.
iii. Appeal to Emotions
There is a wide range of emotions which would help
move Justin, primarily fear of the Journal going down the
tube and sympathy for Klare (these can be enhanced by a
skillful lawyer ... just think about it). Another tactic would
be to induce Justin to feel anger toward the College for putt-
ing everyone in this predicament and achieve unity of pur-
pose with Klare. Or, perhaps, we should enhance Justin's
apprehension about continued litigation by conducting our-
selves or the litigation in such an offensive manner that
Justin and his lawyer would do anything to avoid dealing
with us.9
7
2. Plan the Presentation of Persuasion
The manner in which the message is presented may have
as much of an impact on the success of advocacy as the con-
tent. A failure to plan the presentation carefully can under-
mine the most brilliant concepts.
Modern efforts to teach advocacy have focused on mat-
ters of technique, of presentation. Current instructional
methods are designed to teach lawyers customary rules of
lawyer behavior in discrete contexts such as appellate advoca-
cy, trial practice and negotiation as well as to teach the appli-
cation of rules of procedure and evidence. Most texts about
law practice were written by practicing lawyers (or lawyers
who are also law professors). By and large, these books rep-
resent the composite of the lawyers' experiences. They pro-
vide sound advice for the most part, but they do not discuss
the theories behind their advice or the relationship between
97. Yes, this would sacrifice much of the personal appeal of the lawyers and
it would present ethical and moral questions.
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theory and practice.
It is not the purpose of this paper to critique existing
advocacy materials, however, even the cursory coverage of
presentation contained in this paper raises questions about
the soundness of some of the advice contained in them. An
overview of presentation from the perspective of rhetoricians
should help lawyers select the modern techniques which best
suit the particular needs of each persuasive effort.
Although it is sometimes difficult to separate form from
substance in legal advocacy, lawyers should consider four
components of form in their planning: organization, style,
delivery and memory."
a. Organization
There is persuasive potential in the order in which the
content of arguments is presented. Although rhetoricians
have tried to codify useful conventions into hard and fast
rules, strict adherence to such rules would present a danger
to lawyers. Particularly in contexts in which the presentation
of a prepared speech is not possible or appropriate (is it
ever in law practice?), persuasion cannot be committed to
any order. The lawyer must remain free to adapt a persua-
sive effort based on the lawyer's on-the-scene analysis of the
decision-maker's reactions. However, this does not diminish
the potential impact of the organization of arguments, even
though the actual presentations may more closely resemble
chaos.
Traditional rhetoricians believed that rhetorical speech
should incorporate the following parts: entrance, narration,
proposition, division, confirmation, confutation and conclu-
sion. Entrance is introducing the topic; narration is a recital
of the circumstances that are required to understand the
points at issue; proposition is specifically stating the speaker's
stand on the issue; division is outlining the points the speak-
er is going to prove; confirmation is the body of the proofs
for the speaker's thesis; confutation is the destruction of the
opponent's arguments; and conclusion is the review and
emotional exhortation.99
98. This is the verba diision of rhetoric (how it is said).
99. Cf J. KINNEAVY, supra note 3, at 264.
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Without attempting to resolve a debate about the constit-
uent parts of a rhetorical speech which has continued for
two thousand years, it is fairly safe to say that advocacy
needs a beginning, a middle, and an end.
The beginning (encompassing entrance and narration)
should introduce the subject and make the desired result
known to the audience (if this is not necessary for a particu-
lar decision-maker, omit it). The beginning should also get
the attention of the audience. According to Aristotle:
The things to which the audience is most inclined to
listen are things great (momentous, important), things of
special interest (to the hearers themselves), things won-
derful (surprising), and things pleasant (to hear; either in
themselves or their associations); and therefore the speak-
er should always try to produce the impression ( . . . in
his hearers' minds) that things of such kind are his sub-
ject.' 00
The middle segment of advocacy is the body of the argu-
ments for and against what it is that the lawyer is trying to
prove (the thesis, proposition, premise). An initial decision
for the lawyer is when to announce the purpose of the advo-
cacy, that is, what the lawyer is trying to establish (this en-
compasses proposition and division). If led up to by the pre-
sentation of the evidence, it becomes the climax; if the thesis
is announced and then established, this would be the anticli-
max order.'0 ' There is no clearly correct answer.
Traditional rhetoric would instruct a lawyer to take a
stand and explicitly state the thesis at the beginning of the
speech. However, modern research and practice suggests that
an obvious intent has less chance of persuasion than a hid-
den intent. "Thus, persuasion is often most successful when
it parades under the guise of information or explora-
tion . . . . Persuasion must often not appear to be persua-
sion; true art hides the art."0
2
A second decision about the middle segment of an argu-
ment is where to place arguments which prove one's own
position in relation to arguments that destroy the opponent's
position (this encompasses confirmation and confutation).
100. J. KINNEAVY, supra note 3, at 266.
101. Perry Mason is the master of the climax order.
102. J. KINNEAVY, supra note 3, at 285.
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Three orders have been recommended, based on the
strength of the arguments: the order of increasing strength,
the order of decreasing strength and the Nestorian order
(begin and end with the strongest arguments).0 3 Perelman
does not believe there is a proper order, except in regard to
the particular audience. "[E]ach argument ought to come at
the moment at which it can have the greatest impact. But
since what persuades one audience does not convince anoth-
er, the effort of adaptation must always be taken up
anew." 1
04
Empirical studies have supported this notion. "Instead of
a general law of primacy or recency, there exists an assort-
ment of variables, some of which produce primacy, others of
which produce recency, and still others of which produce
either primacy or recency, depending on their placement and
utilization in a two-sided message."0 5 The conclusion is
that organization does not make or break most arguments. It
is how the organization is used to present the material with
clarity and interest that counts.
0 6
b. Style
Style" 7 involves the selection of the words to be used
in a persuasive effort. "Style is thinking out into lan-
guage."' Considerations of matters related to style domi-
nate much of the literature about rhetoric. "Yet, despite the
abundance of material on something like 'the characteristics
of persuasive discourse,' it remains true that much of what is
said about rhetorical style is intuitive and speculative."0 9
The so-called virtues of style in classical rhetoric are:
clarity, dignity, propriety, and correctness. Clarity stresses the
use of ordinary or natural language to ensure that the mes-
sage is understood by the audience. Dignity or impressive-
ness, on the other hand, emphasizes the use of unusual or
103. Cf C. PERELMAN, supra note 7, at 148.
104. C. PERELMAN, supra note 7, at 149.
105. PERSUASION, supra note 23, at 168.
106. PERSUASION, supra note 23, at 169.
107. This involves that part of rhetoric referred to as elocutio, which to the
ancient Greeks meant "Style," not the act of speaking with which the word elocu-
tion is associated today.
108. E. CORBETr, supra note 3, at 414.
109. J. KINNEAVY, supra note 3, at 275.
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extraordinary words to call attention to certain aspects of a
presentation; it is embellishment. Propriety or fitness or de-
corum has to do with the appropriateness of the language
for a particular audience."' The virtue of purity or correct-
ness has to do with the proper use of grammar and words.
In classical rhetoric, it was considered important to use fault-
less and pure diction.
The need for persuasive language to be clear, yet dis-
tinct, presents a paradox. Language must be sufficiently clear
in order to establish a linguistic bond between the lawyer
and the decision-maker. Yet it must also have a quality that
is sufficiently unique to call attention to the message and
separate it from the ordinary.
Aristotle said the following about the impressiveness of
language:
[D]eparture from the ordinary makes [speech] appear
more dignified. In this respect, people feel the same in
regard to style as in regard to foreigners and
fellow-citizens. Wherefore we should give our language a
"foreign air"; for men admire what is remote, and that
which excites admiration is pleasant .... [T]hose who
practise [sic] this artifice must conceal it and avoid the
appearance of speaking artificially instead of naturally;
for that which is natural persuades, but the artificial does
not. For men become suspicious of one whom they think
to be laying a trap for them, as they are of mixed
wines."'
Every lawyer has personal characteristics which will per-
meate all persuasive efforts and provide some unique quali-
ties, with or without intentional embellishment. However, the
style must be designed to fit within the dialect of the audi-
ence. If the extraordinary exerts itself too much, the style
110. This article will not discuss the various classifications of style which have
been identified by rhetoricians. Cf. E. CORBETT, supra note 3, at 37. ("[T]here was
fundamental agreement about three levels of style. There was the low or plain
style (atenuata, subtile); the middle or forcible style (mediocris, robusta); and the high
or floid style (gravis, florida).") These are also referred to as the Attic, Rhodian
and Asian styles, respectively. Also, Cf. J. KINNEAVY, supra note 3, at 277. ("It is,
in fact, amazing how many different variations are made on the theme of the
three styles. What is considered Attic in one culture is often viewed as Asian by
another culture, so that the three levels are continually being given new interpre-
tations by different civilizations.")
111. ARISTOTLE, supra note 3, at 351-53.
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itself becomes the message, and persuasion is not achieved.
Persuasive clarity does not necessarily mean clarity in
fact. It does mean that the message, as the lawyer wants the
decision-maker to perceive it, must be clear. Often this will
distort or shield reality from the audience's view. "The clarity
of persuasion is then a filtered clarity. It is not the complete
objective clarity of science or information, but the hearer
must believe he has a clear picture of reality."n 2 (Keep in
mind the image of advocacy involving the equilateral trian-
gles. The goal is to convince the decision-maker that the
message of the lawyer is in fact reality, or is closer to reality
than any other alternative from which the decision-maker can
choose.)
Common devices which are used in persuasion to en-
hance clarity are figures of speech such as simile, symbol,
paradox, metaphor, euphemism, synedoche, metonymy, and
hyperbole.'
3
Advocates also use figures of sound: rhythm, rhyme,
alliteration and other sound patterns. These can have persua-
sive impact. Aldous Huxley had the following to say about
the power of rhythm:
No man, however highly civilized, can listen for very long
to African drumming, or Indian chanting, or Welsh
hymn singing, and retain intact his critical and
self-conscious personality. It would be interesting to take
a group of the most eminent philosophers from the best
universities, shut them up in a hot room with Moroccan
dervishes or Haitian Voodooists and measure, with a stop
watch, the strength of their psychological resistance to
the effects of rhythmic sound ... all we can safely pre-
dict is that if exposed long enough to the tom-toms and
the singing, every one of our philosophers would end by
capering and howling with the savages.""
More current examples of the power of rhythm are obvious
in political and religious slogans and maxims as well as the
sounds of most modern advertising slogans.
112. ARISTOTLE, supra note 3, at 351-53.
113. For a discussion of these, see E. CORBETT, supra note 3, at 459-95.
114. J. KINNEAVY, supra note 3, at 291 (quoting J. A. C. BROWN, TECHNIQUES
OF PERSUASION, FROM PROPAGANDA TO BRAINWASHING 237 (1983).
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c. Delivery
Delivery is acting. "All the world's a stage. And all the
men and women merely players .. ". ." This statement is
probably more fitting for lawyers than for any other group,
including professional thespians. Unlike professional actors
and actresses, most of a lawyer's performances are not con-
ducted in the formality of a courtroom (the lawyer's equiva-
lent of the theatrical stage)." 6 Rather, they occur in offices,
homes and even on the steps of courthouses.
The importance of delivery was not overlooked by the
Greeks. When Demosthenes, the greatest of Greek orators,
was asked what he considered to be the most important part
of rhetoric, he replied, "Delivery, delivery, delivery."" 7 Aris-
totle wrote little about delivery, but he would consider three
qualities about delivery: volume, harmony and rhythm. No
treatise had been composed on delivery in his day; but he
notes that it is "of the greatest importance" and should be
paid attention, not as being right, but as being a necessary
part of influencing opinion." 8
Lawyers should not begin a persuasive effort without
giving some thought to how it will be staged and delivered.
Books for lawyers have not ignored the subject. Lawyers can
find advice about how to create the right atmosphere in the
courtroom," 9 how to decorate and arrange their offices to
create the environment desired for impressing clients or
adversaries, 120 and even how to dress and carry themselves
for maximum effect.' 2' Consistent success, however, may
115. SHtAKESPEARE, As You LIKE IT, Act ii, sc. 7, I, 139.
116. Cf S. GOLDBERG, Trial is Theater, THE FIRST TRIAL IN A NUTSHELL 4
(1982).
117. E. CORBETT, supra note 3, at 38-39.
118. ARISTOTLE, supra note 3, at 345-47. In classical rhetoric the treatment of
delivery concerned the management of the voice and gestures. Precepts were laid
down about the documentation of the voice for the proper pitch, volume, and
emphasis and about pausing and phrasing. In regard to action, orators were
trained in gesturing, in the proper stance and posture of the body, and in the
management of the eyes and facial expressions.
119. Cf J. A. TANFORD, THE TRIAL PROCESS 367-70 (1983).
120. Cf A. S. WATSON, THE LAWYER IN THE INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING
PROCESS (1976).
121. Cf J. RASICOT, JURY SELECTION, BODY LANGUAGE AND THE VISUAL TRIAL
(1983).
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require formal training in theatrical skills, or at least
self-instruction.1
22
d. Memory
Memory was included by Aristotle in his development of
classical rhetoric. This suggests that advocacy is more success-
ful when it is undertaken without reference to notes or other
materials. If so, the lawyer who uses notes for witness exami-
nation, arguments and negotiation would be less persuasive
than the lawyer who operates without them. However, there
appears to have been no modern research on this question.
This division of rhetoric received the least attention in
the rhetoric books. What attention was paid to it focused on
the training of the memory from constant practice and vari-
ous mnemonic devices were suggested to facilitate memori-
zation.' 2 Today, improved understandings about the
human mind have resulted in materials which can aid the
lawyer who is interested in memory improvement.2 4 Still,
however, mnemonic devices remain an important tool. An
example of a mnemonic device was printed recently in the
American Bar Association Journal:
A Speaker's Mnemonic
Think of the word S.P.E.A.K.E.R when you prepare your
talk.
S stands for show business. Audiences like to be enter-
tained.
Prepare. Have an informative, well-organized and interest-
ing talk, and practice your delivery. Be conversational,
don't be an orator.
Energy. Be dynamic; exude enthusiasm.
Anecdotes. Pepper your talk with a generous dose.
Knowledge. Know what you're talking about.
Examples. Use them to explain and simplify your points.
Rapport. Know your audience. Establish a link with them
122. Cf S. L. HULL, STRASBERG'S METHOD (1985); C. STANISLAVSKI, AN ACTOR
PREPARES (E. R. Hapgood trans., 40th ed. 1987); S. MOORE, TIE STANISLAVSKI
SYSTEM (1974); U. HAGEN, RESPECT FOR ACTING (1973).
123. E. CORBETT, supra note 3, at 38.
124. Cf D. BAINE, MEMORY AND INSTRUCTION (1986); S. L. HULL, STRASBERG'S
METHOD (1985), especially ch. 3, "Sense Memory" and ch. 5, "Affective Memory."
1990]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
early in your talk.125
One wonders if the author is aware of coming so close
to describing the components of persuasive argumentation.
i. Presentation of the Klare Case
Rather than attempt a description of how the Kare case
could be presented in any of the potential forums for advo-
cacy, let's consider how the differences among the three
forums might affect our presentations.
Negotiations with President Gilligan would most likely
take place in her office. We would be negotiating from a
position of weakness, almost begging. We would want to be
exceedingly polite and proper. 26
Negotiations with Justin and his attorney would probably
be at our offices or his attorney's (although we might learn
more by trying to have at least one meeting in Justin's of-
fice). We think we are negotiating from a very strong pos-
ture, and we plan to be fairly aggressive, if not downright
obnoxious.
At trial, the setting would be standard and our behavior
would be more regulated than in the other settings. As we
believe the facts and the law favor our side, our primary goal
would be to present Klare in a sympathetic light and to do
nothing which would diminish the jurors' admiration of her.
We would also want to paint Justin as a scoundrel, but not
so much so that the jury would react to our tactics with sym-
pathy for him.
G. Put it All Together
The diverse elements of the persuasive process are inter-
dependent. A persuasive effort is more than the sum of the
components discussed in this paper. Persuasion involves the
125. Teitell, Fearless Public Speaking, A.B.A. J., 94 (Sept. 1, 1988).
126. Recognize that we have an inadequate description of President Gilligan
(or any of the other players in this hypothetical) to really figure out how to most
effectively present our case. Imagine that President Gilligan is either Rosalynn
Carter or Roseanne Barr. We know we would not present the case to each of
them in exactly the same manner, but we still do not know enough about either
of them to design the most effective persuasion plan possible. Imagine, instead,
that President Gilligan is your mother or your wife. Now we might be able to fin-
ish planning the presentation of our case.
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construction of liaisons among facts, premises and conclu-
sions; and the process of planning persuasion creates webs of
argumentative/persuasive communication. 7
There can be no standard rules for how one should
assemble the pieces of any particular persuasive effort. The
subject, the occasion, the audience and the personal charac-
teristics of the lawyer dictate the means to employ to effect
the purposes of advocacy. Effective advocacy requires the
lawyer to be flexible and to adapt persuasive efforts to fit
each particular situation.
Perhaps the best advice for lawyers who want to influ-
ence decisions is to study how people make decisions, for all
legal advocacy is aimed at a decision. It is well beyond the
scope of this paper to explain decision-making adequately.
However, it is important to understand that all decisions
follow the same basic pattern. It does not matter if the deci-
sion is trivial or important. It does not matter if the decision
is hurried or considered. It does not matter if the decision is
being made by a judge, a jury or an opposing party. The
process is the same.
The study of decision-making is an evolving field and the
process is not yet fully understood.128 Consequently, there
are a variety of viewpoints as to the precise components of
the process. However, even an unrefined understanding of
the decision-making process is helpful to the lawyer who
wants to influence decisions. One description of the pro-
cess "'29 includes the following stages:
1. setting of goal.
2. acquisition of information.
3. analysis of information.
4. identification of alternatives.
5. evaluation of the consequences of each alternative.
6. decision.'"
127. Arnold, Implications of Perelman's Theoty of Argumentation for Theoy of Per-
suasion, PRACTICAL REASONING, supra note 24, at 40.
128. Cf McKean, Decisions, Decisions, DISCOVER, 22 (June, 1985). (McKean
describes the recent work of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, two psy-
chologists who have been studying the mental pitfalls in which rational people
find themselves when they try to arrive at logical conclusions.).
129. G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, supta note 56, at 293 (quoting Gelatt,
Decision-Making: A Conceptual Frame of Reference.... 9 J. COUNSELLING PSYCH.
240-45 (1962)).
130. Richard Neumann describes the stages in the creative process almost iden-
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Decisions can be influenced at any stage of the
decision-making process. In putting together a final plan for
persuasion, the lawyer should identify what stage the decision
in question has reached in the decision-making process and
should consider carefully at which stage a persuasive effort
will have the greatest chance of success.
Effective advocacy requires the lawyer to examine each
stage of the decision-making process and to develop strate-
gies for manipulating the process in furtherance of the
client's goals. A lawyer might be able to more easily manipu-
.late some decisions by influencing the decision-makers during
the goal setting stage, while the key in other cases might
involve expanding the number of potential alternatives. No
two decisions involve precisely the same considerations,
therefore, no two persuasive efforts should be precisely the
same.
An example of how lawyers can attempt to manipulate
one stage of the decision-making process is the focus in
"problem-solving negotiation " '3' on searching for solutions
from which both parties can benefit. In problem-solving ne-
gotiation, the lawyer influences decisions by introducing alter-
native solutions which may not otherwise have been consid-
tically:
(1) a recognition stage, in which the problem is noticed in tlhe form
of a gap in knowledge, a frustration, an impending struggle (such as
a negotiation or a cross-examination), or even a need to decide be-
tween or among several desirable alternatives;
(2) a preparation stage, in which the problem is analyzed and infor-
mation gathered in a fairly open-ended manner;
(3) an option-generation stage, in which the largest reasonable number
of potential solutions are hypothesized;
(4) an option-evaluation stage, in which potential solutions are tested
(either analytically or empirically) for effectiveness; and
(5) a decisional stage, in which the evaluations are compared and the
best option chosen.
Neumann, The Art of Critique, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 725, 745 (Apr. 1989) (quoting
Stein, Creativity as Intr- and Inte),Peisonal Process, THE CREATIVE ENCOUNTER 19
(1971)).
131. Cf Menkel-Meadow, supra note 29, at 794. ("Problem solving is an orien-
tation to negotiation which focuses on finding solutions to the parties' sets of
underlying needs and objectives. The problem-solving conception subordinates
strategies and tactics to the process of identifying possible solutions and therefore
allows a broader range of outcomes to negotiation problems." [Of course, utili-
zation of this approach to negotiation is a "strategy" which has been chosen to
produce results desired by one's client.].)
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ered by the opponent.
The advocate should keep in mind at all times that,
while one lawyer is searching for supporting propositions
which are accepted by the decision-makers, another lawyer is
also seeking supporting propositions which would lead the
decision-makers to a different conclusion. Every persuasive
effort "implies a preliminary selection of facts and values,
their specific description in a given language, and an empha-
sis which varies with the importance given them. Choice of
elements, of a mode of description and presentation, judg-
ments of value or importance-all these elements are consid-
ered all the more justifiably as exhibiting a partiality when
one sees more clearly what other choice, what other presen-
tation, what other value judgment could oppose them."'
No systematic approach to advocacy can succeed unless
it has the flexibility to adapt itself to human experience,
knowledge and aspirations. Although the principles of persua-
sion outlined in this article provide guidelines which allow
this flexibility, in the end, an advocate must rely on personal
insights, convictions and beliefs in deciding how to imple-
ment each persuasive effort. A comprehensive vision of per-
suasion will help a lawyer succeed more consistently as an
advocate.
H. Consider Moral Implications of the Plan
Once the lawyer is satisfied with the potential effective-
ness of a persuasion plan, one question remains: is it the
right thing to do?
The principles of advocacy teach methods of persuasion.
They have no inherent foundation of moral values; advocacy
skills can be used as effectively to do evil as to do good.
This should be of concern to all lawyers.
Plato in the Gorgias characterized rhetoric as "ignoble"
and "bad." He considered it a deceit of the soul, an ap-
pearance of justice which induces belief without knowl-
edge. 33 Socrates said that a good rhetoric could exist, but
no one has ever practiced it.
13
132. C. PERELMAN, supra note 7, at 34.
133. J. KINNEAVY, supra note 3, at 221.
134. J. KINNEAVY, supra note 3, at 221.
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Aristotle's response to criticism that rhetoric put too
much power in the hands of the individual was "it would be
absurd if it were considered disgraceful not to be able to
defend oneself with the help of the body, but not disgraceful
as far as speech is concerned, whose use is more characteris-
tic of man than that of the body. If it is argued that one
who makes an unfair use of such faculty of speech may do a
great deal of harm, this objection applies equally to all good
things except virtue, and above all to those things which are
most useful, such as strength, health, wealth, generalship; for
as these, rightly used, may be of the greatest benefit, so,
wrongly used, they may do an equal amount of harm.""3 5
The power of American lawyers is not as unfettered as
that of individual citizens of ancient Greece. Lawyers are
members of a profession. As such, we are governed by a
code of ethics and a common aspiration to provide beneficial
public services. These regulate the freedom we have to apply
skills of persuasion without concern for the impact on an
opponent's interests or those of society in general. Unfortu-
nately, the risk of being disciplined for using improper per-
suasive tactics is very slim.
On the other hand, unwritten professional norms which
reflect the realities of law practice in each segment of the
profession provide greater protection against abuses of per-
suasion than the formal rules which govern professional con-
duct. These represent the collective hierarchy of professional
role values as recognized in local customs and practices and
as demonstrated by mentors and other lawyers who have
reputations as leaders in their fields. Few lawyers will risk
their livelihoods by flagrantly departing from modes of prac-
tice which have been set by peers who observe their conduct
(including opponents and colleagues). However, professional
norms do not provide complete protection for the public,
especially where particular norms seem to encourage harmful
persuasive techniques.
In the final analysis, our conduct is governed by our
personal values. Whereas rules of professional conduct and
professional norms regulate the freedom we have to apply
skills of persuasion without concern for the impact on an
135. ARISTOTLE, supra note 3. at 13.
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opponent's interests or those of society in general, only our
personal values can regulate any desire we may have to act
without concern for the consequences of our actions. Law-
yers do what we believe will result in our greatest personal
happiness, and there is no other excuse for employing harm-
ful methods of persuasion. If we do something harmful, we
do so because we want to do it.
I am not suggesting that lawyers should abdicate their
responsibility to provide zealous representation whenever
they become convinced that the results of winning a particu-
lar case would be unjust or morally wrong. Our system of
adversarial justice could not tolerate such conduct. There are
times when lawyers must choose to take action on behalf of
the client which is personally distasteful to us. Our society
demands it, and lawyers whose personal values prevent them
from zealously representing their clients' interests are proba-
bly in the wrong line of work. One of a lawyers highest per-
sonal values must be to faithfully discharge his or her re-
sponsibilities to the client.
This does not excuse those lawyers, however, who do
not search for approaches to persuasion which reconcile
professional and moral responsibilities. "Professional obliga-
tions" should not be used as a shield to justify harmful per-
suasive efforts unless no other viable course of action exists.
When deciding whether to take a particular approach to
persuasion, we should remember to ask whether it is the
moral thing to do and, if it is not, we should search for a
better way to accomplish our clients' objectives.
IV. CONCLUSION
Persuasion is a broad concept. In law practice, it encom-
passes a range of activities from the evolution of litigation
strategies in complex litigation to convincing a clerk of court
into helping you resolve a minor procedural problem. The
product of the process of planning for persuasion can be
mounds of trial notebooks backed by sophisticated computer
programs or it can be the scowl (or smile) you decide to use
to persuade the clerk to help. The persuasive effort can last
years or be over in a flash. In all cases, however, the basic
principles or persuasion remain the same, and each step in
the planning process is traversed-whether via a methodical
plan or a subconscious collage.
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Lawyers cannot win every case or every argument. The
guidelines for planning persuasive efforts in this paper do
not guarantee success. They will help avoid gaps during a
lawyer's analysis of opportunities for persuasion. They will
also help lawyers select the best possible strategies for advo-
cacy and make it easier to interpret and counter the maneu-
vers of opponents. They are one more tool for the lawyer
who wants to become a master of persuasion.
While this article should prove to be a useful tool for
practicing lawyers and for law teachers, its primary purpose
is to provide fresh perspectives about legal advocacy and to
stimulate further thinking and research which will eventually
enable us to describe legal persuasion from A to Z.
